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ABSTRACT

Recent airline accidents point to a crew’s failure to make correct and timely
decisions following a sudden and unusual event that startled the crew. This study
sought to determine if targeted training could augment decision making during a startle
event. Following a startle event cognitive function is impaired for a short duration of
time (30-90 seconds). In aviation, critical decisions are often required to be made
during this brief, but critical, time frame.
A total of 40 volunteer crews (80 individual pilots) were solicited from a global
U.S. passenger airline. Crews were briefed that they would fly a profile in the simulator
but were not made aware of what the profile would entail. The study participants were
asked to complete a survey on their background and flying preferences. Every other
crew received training on how to handle a startle event. The training consisted of a
briefing and simulator practice. Crew members (subjects) were either presented a low
altitude or high altitude scenario to fly in a full-flight simulator.
The maneuver scenarios were analyzed using a series of one-way ANOVAs, ttests and regression for the main effect of training on crew performance. The data

xii

indicated that the trained crews flew the maneuver profiles significantly better than the
untrained crews and significantly better than the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) standards. Each scenario’s sub factors were analyzed using
regression to examine for specific predictors of performance. The results indicate that
in the case of the high altitude profile, problem diagnosis was a significant factor, in the
low altitude profile, time management was also a significant factor. These predicators
can be useful in further targeting training.
The study’s findings suggest that targeted training can help crews manage a
startle event, leading to a potential reduction of inflight loss of control accidents. The
training was broad and intended to cover an overall aircraft handling approach rather
than being aircraft specific. Inclusion of this type of training by airlines has the potential
to better aid crews in handling sudden and unusual events.

xiii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Emergencies in aircraft often involve high-stress decision-making, which must be
accomplished correctly in real time, often with limited information. Crews are often
startled at the onset of such events. Even correct decision-making at the outset of an
emergency may not guarantee a successful outcome. Unfortunately, incorrect initial
decisions at the start of an emergency often result in delayed aircraft recovery and in
some cases lead to an undesired aircraft state (UAS). Decisions in stressful
environments are often made with information from past experiences, training, and
pattern matching (Rasmussen, 1983). Although each emergency is surrounded by
unique circumstances, training over a broad array of scenarios and circumstances may
give flight crews enough background information to manage the situation for a
successful outcome.
A study completed by Woodhead (1969) found decrements on a decision-making
following a startle event. Thackray (1969) also found that major performance
decrement following a startle event probably occurs within the first few seconds. In the
official report on Air France flight 447, the Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BAE,

2012) stated, “The startle effect played a major role in the destabilization of the flight
path and in the two pilots understanding the situation.” Startle training may be a key
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element in effective emergency flight training. During such training, crews are exposed
to different, complex, and unusual situations they would not normally encounter under
normal flight conditions. The purpose of this type of training is to develop the pattern
behavior of systematically dealing with complex emergencies.
Problem Statement
Recent airline accidents point to a rapid degradation from controlled flight
following an unusual event when the flight crew becomes startled. There has been very
little training among airline crews on how to successfully manage a sudden and often
stressful event that requires quick and accurate decision-making (BAE, 2012). Accident
data has indicated that when an incorrect decision is made, the likelihood of a
successful outcome decreases (Hilscher, Breiter, & Kochan, 2012). This study seeks to
determine if specific and targeted training can help mitigate the effects of flight crews
being startled by implementing a set of techniques designed to help stabilize the
cognitive thought process and bridge the time of cognitive degradation.
Purpose of the Study
The intent of this mixed methods study is to test the theory that enhanced
specific training can provide an effective countermeasure to fill the temporary cognitive
degradation that occurs during a startle event. The study will use both survey and
observed simulator performance data to test the theory. If the hypothesis is correct,
specific training could be added to airline qualification programs to better equip airline
crews in dealing with sudden, unusual events.
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Research Design
The research is designed as a mixed methods study using quantitative analysis
methods. In the first phase, a survey will be conducted of the participating air carrier
pilots. This survey will be used to gauge the pilot's own perceptions of their flying skills
during a startle event. The analysis will explore for common threads of pilot thinking
and reactions. The results of the survey will be compared and correlated to the data
from the aircraft simulator scenario sets.
The second phase of the study involves evaluating professional airline pilots
flying two different scenarios in an FAA approved Level-D full flight simulator (FFS). The
scenarios will be flown by a crew consisting of a captain and first officer, similar to what
would happen in actual line operations. Each crew will be presented either a low or
high altitude scenario depending on the day of the week. Randomly selected crews will
receive training on handling the aircraft during a startle event. The pilot group that does
not receive the startle training will be considered the control group. This group will be
referred to as the untrained group for the purposes of this study. The training consists
of both a briefing and simulator practice. The training briefing is via an in person
discussion on the proper pitch, power, and bank, settings that should be flown in an
unusual event. The briefing also discusses time recognition especially at low altitudes
and fuel states. The training continues with simulator practice using the techniques
discussed in the briefing. The practice sessions are not the same as the evaluation
profiles. Each crew will practice both a low altitude and high altitude scenario.
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The first test scenario is a low altitude and low fuel profile. Time pressure and an
unexpected missed approach combine to form the startle event and event evaluation
begins at the missed approach. The second test scenario is a high altitude profile. The
profile induces a loss of air data followed by an engine fire bell that causes the startle
event. Evaluation begins at the loss of air data. In terms of procedures, the loss of air
data is often referred to by aircraft manufacturers as Mach/Airspeed Unreliable. Data
analysis will consist of regression, ANOVA, and post-hoc Tukey tests. The analysis looks
for differences between trained and untrained groups with regression looking for
differences within groups such as previous experience.
Research Questions
The research questions surround the cognitive gap that is perceived to exist
during a startle event and to what extent training can mitigate the gap.
1. Can targeted training be successful in helping pilots maintain aircraft
control during an unusual and sudden startle event?
a. Does the spatial proximity of the event have any effect on the
outcome (low or high altitude)?
b. Since accident data indicates that accidents occur more frequently
with the captain flying and on the first day and first leg of a trip, does
the pilot flying, either the captain or the first officer, have any effect
on the successful outcome of the event?
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2. Is there an indication in the pilot’s survey answers that is a predictor of
being able to successfully handle a startle event?
Assumptions
The list below is not meant to be all-encompassing but to inform the reader as to
the major aspects involved in the study. This study develops findings based on the
following assumptions.
1. Each participant is a qualified, Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certified FAR part
121 jet transport pilot employed by a U.S. air carrier.
2. Each participant has spent at least one year in the specific seat (Captain or
First Officer) and type of aircraft. It is assumed that after one year of
experience on a particular aircraft, that the pilot will be normalized to flying
that particular aircraft (the aircraft will not be “new” to them).
3. Each pilot is current and qualified in the respective aircraft. Current and
qualified indicates that the pilot can be scheduled to fly a regular passenger
trip at any time.
4. Each pilot is considered a line pilot. For the purpose of this assumption, line
pilot means that each pilot flies their respective airplane at regular intervals.
Line pilots include; Captains, First Officers, Line Check Airman, and
Instructors/Evaluators
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5. Except for the group that receives training, the pilots have no prior
knowledge or practice of the maneuver that is to be flown and is given no
opportunity to practice it beforehand.
6. Each pilot is assumed to fly to the best of their ability during the maneuver.
Limitations
The study sought to mitigate possible limitations that could skew the results.
Although each study has a set of unique limitations, the results of this study should be
considered in the context of the limitations listed below.
1. The maneuver sets are flown in a simulator that is realistic in nature but
involves simulation limits specifically the general lack of g-forces.
2. The study only looks at two maneuver sets.
3. Aircraft emergencies are often dynamic and are unique to each situation.
4. The study only observed professional pilots flying transport category
aircraft.
5. Crews volunteered for this study which may indicate a higher awareness of
safety.
6. Crews were sampled directly after their recurrent training which may
increase their proficiency above what might be expected in normal line
operations.
Expected Findings
The study has four major groups of subjects that are being compared to a set
standard as defined the FAA and airline policy for successful outcomes. The study
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expects to find crews that receive training will become more aware and proficient on
how to handle an inflight emergency with regards to the first few critical decisions
and/or actions. The expectations are that the trained group for both low and high
altitude scenarios will show a statistically significant increase in performance when
compared to the non-trained groups. In addition, when collapsed for maneuvers sets,
the trained groups should show a significant increase in performance than the nontrained group. Items such as past experience and current outside flying might be
reasonably expected to also influence success.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
A literature review was conducted of pertinent articles related to this study.
Although there were no direct studies on this particular problem, there were many
articles related to decision making, startle effect, and time critical actions required by
flight crews. The review begins by relating a discussion on training of unusual events and
why practice is important for improved performance. The literature review then
discusses what startle effect is and how it effects cognition, decision making and pilot
responses. The review then takes the theoretical discussion and relates it to actual
aircraft accidents using the official reports as a background. This literature review is not
meant to be all encompassing, but to give the reader a broad overview of the issues
surrounding this study.
Training and Unusual Events
Accident reports describe many situations where pilots responded to abnormal
events in ways that were unexpected from the way that they were trained (Casner,
Geven, & Willliams, 2012). Unfortunately, training and testing of professional airline
pilots have become somewhat routine and predictable. In short, the flight crews know
what to expect as they see the same maneuvers at each training event.
8

In a study by Dr. Stephen Casner, (when) pilots were evaluated performing
routine training events and unexpected (but similar) ones. Pilot responses to the
routine events showed little variability. In contrast, pilot responses in the unexpected
maneuvers showed great variability from pilot to pilot (Casner, Geven, & Willliams,
2012). The results of the study showed that most pilots generally experience the same
sequence of abnormal events, presented under similar circumstances. This is due to
both the airline training environment and the regulatory environment as set forth by the
FAA. This training calls into question the extent to which pilots have the ability to
respond to abnormal events in actual operations (Casner, Geven, & Willliams, 2012).
Casner, Geven, and Williams, suggested that such training can lead to shallow and
memorized understandings of problem situations which in turn do not lead to an ability
to transfer this training to different encounters in actual operations (Casner, Geven, &
Willliams, 2012). The end result of the study was that pilots struggle to recognize
unexpected situations with the result of considerably delayed responses (Casner, Geven,
& Willliams, 2012).
It is unlikely that training alone can eliminate the element of surprise from
unexpected events although skill and experience are known to reduce the occurrence
and/or severity (Merk, 2009). Furthermore, for unusual events, pilots would benefit
from exposure without the use of automation to enable them to better recognize the
situation itself rather than respond to an alert (Wiener, 1985). Finally, the most
important step in training is to train abnormal events over a wide array of circumstances
and operation parameters (Casner, Geven, & Willliams, 2012).
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Safety management tends to focus on prevention of errors and failures. In most
failure cases, there are opportunities to recover from the failure through the timely and
effective application of countermeasures. The aim of the countermeasures to prevent
the negative consequences of the failure (Kranse & van der Schaaf, 2001). In the case of
unforeseen failures, human operators play a key role in the application of effective
countermeasures. Researchers generally agree that the failure compensation process
has three phases:
•

Phase One: Detection of the fact that something has gone wrong

•

Phase Two: Explanation or localization of the causes

•

Phase Three: Correction of the problem through planning and execution
of countermeasures

A study by Kranse, and van der Schaaf, (2001) asked the question: how does the
failure compensation process work, and what factors influence the process? A failure
can be a combination of technical, organizational, or human factors. Detection of the
situation is always the first failure compensation phase to occur (Kranse & van der
Schaaf, 2001). After the detection phase, time often dictates the next step. The
corrective action can be performed immediately (usually the case in aviation) or on a
longer term for systemic issues. The study examined 50 reported failures at a chemical
plant. The failures were all reported via a voluntary safety reporting system similar to
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) reporting systems. The study noted that in most
detection and localization phases unplanned actions (not trained) occurred. In the
detection phase, 46 out of 50 cases (92%) involved unplanned actions (Kranse & van der
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Schaaf, 2001). For failures requiring immediate localization, 100% involved some
unplanned actions. Such was the same for events requiring immediate correction,
where 80% involved unplanned actions (Kranse & van der Schaaf, 2001). Even in events
that were not as time critical, where longer term corrections were sought, 77%
experienced unplanned actions (Kranse & van der Schaaf, 2001). Generally, the type
and severity of potential consequences were the most practical factor in deciding which
recovery paths to take. The Kranse and van der Schaaf study has important implications
for any type of aviation training in as much as untrained actions will invariably take
place in a recovery from an unusual event.
Practice and Performance
A study that was published in (McKinney & Davis, 2003)researched the effects of
deliberate practice on crisis situations. Within professional domains, deliberate practice
has been positively correlated with improved performance (McKinney & Davis, 2003).
The study examined the question, “do the benefits of deliberate practice create superior
performance if part of the task is unpracticed?” (McKinney & Davis, 2003). Researchers
reviewed decision-making under crisis conditions using a total decision effectiveness
model. The model evaluated both the initial assessment and the actions taken for both
practiced and unpracticed maneuvers. Additional studies have indicated that deliberate
practice results in automated pattern matching of problems with solutions (Richman,
Gobet, Stazewski, & Simon, 1996). Practiced skills allow for a more accurate diagnoses
of the situation, and improves both speed of action and the accuracy of recall (Klein G. ,
1993). Practice may aid in the cognitive processes through enhancement of higher
11

levels of searching and evaluating. This, in turn, might enhance the ability to
extrapolate beyond the presented data and make use of long-term memory items which
is richer and more organized than short-term memory (Ericcsson, 1996).
For this study, wholly practiced maneuvers are ones that pilots have deliberately
practiced either in flight, or more likely, in the simulator. Each of these maneuvers had
a best practice solution, which was reinforced on a regular basis. In contrast a partially
practiced maneuver was defined as a specific aircraft malfunction, occurring within a
wider flying scenario that was novel or unique, and a maneuver that the pilot could not
have practiced (McKinney & Davis, 2003). These maneuvers could include items such
as multiple system failures, flight control malfunctions, and unusual failure modes. The
data for the study was compiled from 173 U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft mechanical
malfunction incidents. In each case, the mishap was classified as either wholly practiced
or partially practiced. Three independent panels of experienced Air Force pilots
reviewed and rated the mishaps. The action taken by the pilots was rated as effective or
ineffective (McKinney & Davis, 2003). Furthermore, a third group of evaluators were
asked further define where the failure occurred in cases of ineffective responses. The
group sought to define if the ineffective responses were in the decision-making process,
or in the selection of action process. To evaluate the research questions, logistic
regression analysis was used as a tool for predicting group membership in cases where
dependent variables are dichotomous (McKinney & Davis, 2003). In total 83 of the
events were characterized as wholly practiced, of which 68 ended with effective
decisions and 15 with ineffective decisions (McKinney & Davis, 2003). The study
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concluded that deliberate practice has a positive effect on crisis decision-making
performance (McKinney & Davis, 2003). Increased performance was noted for each
decision phase for wholly practiced maneuvers. However, the study also found that no
relationship existed where the crisis-flying scenario was unpracticed (McKinney, 2003).
The study also noted that deliberate practice within the flying domain was not related
to overall decision-making performance (McKinney & Davis, 2003).
Startle Effect
Startle effect is quite different than startle training. The startle response has
been well researched and documented over the past 60 years. A startle response
happens when the human brain is presented with a situation that completely
overwhelms the available cognitive resources needed to effectively mitigate the
situation. It has been widely established through psychological research that our ability
to regulate our own thoughts and behaviors becomes diminished during an emotional
event (Hilscher, Breiter, & Kochan, 2012). This diminished ability is compounded by the
reliability of today’s modern aircraft, which has created a conditioned expectation of
normalcy amongst pilots (Martin, Murray, & Bates, 2012). Research has shown that
there are considerable cognitive effects on information processing following a startle
event. The results indicate that strong cognitive and dexterous impairment could last
for up to 30 seconds following a strong startle (Vlasek, 1969; Woodhead M. M., 1959;
Woodhead M. , 1969; Thackray & Touchstone, 1970). A pilot describing an encounter
with severe turbulence described the situation as “the constant audible warnings came
from far-off, detached from the struggle in the cockpit” (Hilscher, Breiter, & Kochan,
13

2012). The Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BAE) in the official report on Air France
Flight 447 (AF447) accident, the made the following statements:
“The startle effect played a major role in the destabilization of the flight
path and in the two pilots understanding the situation. Initial and
recurrent training as delivered today does not promote and test the
capacity to react to the unexpected. Indeed, the exercises are repetitive,
well known to crews and do not enable skills in resource management to
be tested outside of this context.
All of the effort invested in anticipation and predetermination of
procedural responses does not exclude the possibility of situations with a
‘fundamental surprise’ for which the current system does not generate
the indispensable capacity to react.” (BAE, 2012)
The response of the brain, and the consequent behavior is an amalgamation
resulting from past experience and general expertise (Isaac, 2012). Once an unusual
situation has been determined to exist, pilots attempt to compare the situation with
past experiences through a sequence of pattern matching and decision-making. The
outcome often relies on the severity of unusual circumstance and emergency training.
In addition, other factors include prior experience and the ability to accept the actual
facts of the situation. Discrepancies between perception and the actual aircraft state
leads to a breakdown of a pilot’s mental picture, which in turn can lead to a loss of
situational awareness (Hilscher, Breiter, & Kochan, 2012). Surprising events can place
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the pilot into a very high state of arousal that can render them ineffective in complex
decision-making tasks (Hilscher, Breiter, & Kochan, 2012). The final response is often a
strongly developed behavior with the purpose, in extreme cases, of survival. There are
examples in which highly trained crews discarded indications from instruments and
flight training after a startle event (Isaac, 2012). This leads to disbelieving what is
actually presented to the crew from the aircraft’s systems. Once an unusual or
emergency situation is presented, a pilot will generally be limited in their response. The
response tends to fall into patterns a pilot has seen before, and will also be subjected to
several decision-making, behavioral biases. An objective that is not addressed in
traditional flight training is behavioral management that promotes progressive
functionality under conditions of uncertainty and fear (Hilscher, Breiter, & Kochan,
2012).
Automation Bias and Complacency
Automated decision aids support decision-making in complex environments. As
such, automation is assuming increasing control of cognitive flight tasks, such as
calculating fuel-efficient routes, navigating, or detecting and diagnosing system
malfunctions and abnormalities (Mosier, 1998). These systems are designed to support
the human cognitive processing of information to correctly assess a given situation and
to respond appropriately (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). Automation-induced
complacency and bias represent closely linked theoretical concepts that show
considerable overlap with respect to underlying processes (Parasuraman & Manzey,
2010). Automation complacency can occur when the automation competes for the
15

pilot’s attention in a multiple task load environment (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010).
Although somewhat different but interconnected, automation bias results in making
both omission and commission errors when the automated decision aids are not
accurate (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). These two issues affect both novice and
expert pilots and cannot generally be mitigated through training.
Research studies have indicated that automation does not always enhance
human activity. In some cases, automation can change behavior patterns in ways that
are unintended, and cannot be unanticipated by automation designers (Parasuraman &
Manzey, 2010). Automated systems in today’s modern aircraft are highly accurate and
reliable. The end result is that pilots can develop a premature cognitive commitment
regarding the information displayed by the automation and disregard other conflicting
information (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). Automation bias can lead to incorrect
decisions that are not based on a complete analysis of the available information and can
compromise performance especially in the case of automation failure.
Automated decision aids are misused for two main reasons. The first reason is
that automation generated cues are usually salient, and by design, draw the user’s
attention (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). The second major factor is that users have a
cognitive bias to assign greater relevance to automated cues over other sources of data
(Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010).
In a study by Layton, Smith, and McCoy (1994), a comparison of electronic flight
planning tools was examined. Pilots who were given highly automated flight plans spent
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less time and effort evaluating alternate plans than groups working with manually
developed plans. This result was consistent with the cognitive-miser hypothesis of
automation bias (Layton, Smith, & McCoy, 1994). The pilots tended to accept the plan
generated by the automation even when it produced less than optimal solutions.
Another study on automation bias sought to quantify the effects of automation
over-reliance in modern cockpits. This study pointed out the need for pilots to be able
to fly the airplane when the automation does not function correctly. Automation bias
refers to omission and commission errors resulting from the use of automated cues as a
heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing (Mosier, Skitka,
Heers, & Burdick, 1997). Highly automated cockpits tend to change the way pilots
perform tasks and make decisions. Researchers have documented problems in the use
of advanced automated systems, including mode misunderstanding, failures to
understand automated behavior, confusion or lack of awareness concerning what
automated systems are doing, and difficulty tracing the functioning or reasoning process
of the automated agent (Billings, 1996). Figure 1 below diagrams both positive and
negative feedback loops associated with automation. Each loop or pathway can lead to
bias on the part of the pilot.
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Figure 1. Automation Bias (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010)
Pilots are trained and develop their skills assessment through the use of both
system and environmental cues (cross checking of information). In most situations,
processing is facilitated by inter-correlations among cues (Wickens & Flach, 1998). In
the cross-checking environment, related to older technology aircraft, pilots often looked
for many cues in determining if a problem existed. Using these skills, pilots know and
look for patterns or combination of cues that are most ecologically valid, reliable, or
relevant for diagnosing particular situations. They are able to incorporate contextual
information to formulate a workable action plan based on their assessment of these
cues (Kaempf & Klein, 1994).
When automated aids are introduced, the pattern of cue utilization is disrupted.
Automated aids present powerful and generally highly accurate cues. This leads to the
overall attitude that the automated cues are not just another cue, but the most
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powerful and important cue. These automated decision aids support the general
human tendency “to travel the road” of least cognitive effort. People will generally
utilize heuristics (cognitive shortcuts) to reduce effort and information load.
For rigid tasks that do not require flexible decision-making automation can often
provide the best solution (Cummings, 2016). In time-critical environments that have
external and changing constraints, higher levels of automation may not be advisable due
to the risks and the complexity of the decision aids not being perfectly stable.
(Cummings, 2016). Situation awareness, complacency, and skill degradation are the
measurable costs of automation bias.
Breakdown in Coordination
Errors can never be completely eliminated necessitating the need for detection,
diagnosis, and recovery (United Airlines, 2016). Event driving tasks and domains have
seen a lack of research in error diagnosis and recovery (Nikolic & Sarter, 2007). A study
jointly conducted by the Boeing Company and the University of Michigan in 2007sought
to some insight into error and disturbance management strategies. The study noted
that pilots seldom follow the canonical path to handle disturbance events (Nikolic &
Sarter, 2007). A canonical path can be considered the most optimum solution that is
technically correct in developing diagnosis and recovery options. Detection of such
events were often observed to be delayed due to pilots’ knowledge gaps and time
criticality, and in many cases, generic and inefficient recovery strategies were observed
(Nikolic & Sarter, 2007). In addition, pilots often relied on high levels of automation to
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manage the consequences of the induced errors. The study noted that pilots often
attempt to diagnose automation-related problems before they responded to the actual
disturbance handling (Nikolic & Sarter, 2007), meaning that pilots tended to become
focused on the automation instead of flying the aircraft. All 18 pilot crews in the Boeing
study struggled at some point with handling events (actual flying) during a simulated
flight in the B747. It was noted that the pilots in the study rarely attempted to diagnose
the source of the disturbance (Nikolic & Sarter, 2007). The study findings of indicate
that poor disturbance management is somewhat related to the design of the
automation interfaces (Nikolic & Sarter, 2007).
Cognitive Resources
As skill levels decline, a pilot must devote more cognitive resources when
situations such as emergencies, system failures, or other issues that force a pilot into
manual flying. In addition, a pilot begins to lose the ability to mentally project where
the airplane is in space with regards to altitude, airspeed, and configuration. Simply
stated, a pilot’s cognitive resources (in fact every human) is finite.
Two basic parameters affect performance: the amount of cognitive resources
available to the pilot and the complexity of the task or situation. Task performance
depends on the relation between the two parameters, cognitive resources available and
the complexity of the situation. As long as the amount of resources consumed by the
task is lower than, or equal to, the available amount of memory, task performance will
be adequate (Ippel, 1987). However, task performance will gradually decline relative to
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the degree that tasks impose cognitive loads that exceed the available amount of
resources (Ippel, 1987). If too little processing resource is applied (because of
limitations to the availability of processing resources), performance failure is to be
expected. As more and more resources are applied to the task the likelihood of
successful performance increases (Norman & Bobrow, 1975).
Startle Effect and Cognitive Consequences
The startle effect is common to all mammals (Simons, 1996). It consists of an
involuntary reaction to an unusual stimulus. This reflex usually happens quickly
following the stimulus, generally in as little as 14 milliseconds (Yeomans & Frankland,
1996). Research has suggested a link between common patterns of the startle reflex
and the neural pathways involved (Davis, 1986; Eaton, 1984; Landis & Hunt, 1939; Lang,
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990; LeDoux J. E., 2000; LeDoux J. , 1996; Whalen & Phelps, 2009).
These actions involve various senses and muscles and the amygdala in the limbic region
of the brain. The initial analysis happens very quickly (500 milliseconds) and results in
an aversive reflex away from the stimulus. The startle reaction may last between .3 to
1.5 seconds, depending on the severity (Martin, Murray, & Bates, 2012). An issue arises
when the threat persists and the startle reaction becomes a full-blown startle or
surprise reaction, otherwise known as “flight or fight.” This process can lead to
confusion or delays in processing. When people are startled and the threat persists,
such as in a life-threatening aircraft emergency, then the startle reflex is likely to
transition into a full startle reaction, with its ensuing activation of the sympathetic
nervous system (Martin, Murray, & Bates, 2012). A sudden startling event can have
21

negative effects on performance (Martin, Murray, & Bates, 2012). This is especially
detrimental in the case of an emergency were correct decision-making is important to
resolve an issue. A study conducted for the FAA (1969), demonstrated that a startle
event negatively affected performance and, also noted that recovery of performance
following a startle event appears to be quite rapid (Thackray & Touchstone, 1970).
Upon initial presentation of the startle stimulus, maximum disruption occurred during
the first five seconds after the stimulation, with significant but considerably less
disruption after the second 5-second interval lasting from 30 seconds to one minute
(Thackray & Touchstone, 1970).
Vlasak (1969) in his study, investigated the effects of startle on a continuous
task. This task was measured for accuracy and consistency. Test participants were
given a task of continuous mental subtraction. Subtraction was found to be significantly
impaired for 15 secconds following stimulation (Vlasek, 1969). For the reaction time
tasks, there was insufficient data given to determine the precise duration of
impairment, although both were impaired temporarily following startle event (Vlasek,
1969). In a similar study, Woodhead (1969) found decrements on decision-making
following sudden noise stimulation that lasted, from 17 to 31 seconds. It would appear
from the results of Woodhead’s study, and from others who have investigated
performance recovery that major performance decrement following startle probably
occurs within the first few seconds (Thackray & Touchstone, 1970). A lesser but
significant decrement may last for periods from 10 to 30 seconds after startle. This
underperformance has been shown in some accidents to be a period of time where
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making correct decisions were critical to recovery. Interviews with startled pilots and
qualitative data in flight simulator experiments suggest that the negative effects of
startle effect are real and in some cases can be significant (Martin, Murray, & Bates,
2012).
Decision-Making Model
There are a number of decision-making models that attempt to explain how
pilots make decisions. Aeronautical decision-making is complex and there is not always
a clear link between the decisions made and event outcome (Plant & Stanton, 2013).
Schema theory explains how people interact and make decisions using stored mental
representations, and forms an integral part of the perceptual cycle model (PCM).
Aeronautical decision-making is a form of naturalistic decision-making (NDM); (Klein,
Calderwood, & Macgregor, 1989) in which decision makers have domain expertise and
make decisions in contexts, which are usually characterized by limited time, goal
conflicts and dynamic conditions (Plant & Stanton, 2013). A high proportion of pilot
errors are related to decisional errors (Diehl, 1991; Orasanu & Martin, 1998; Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2009).
Naturalistic decision making (NDM) is complex due in part to the weakly
correlated link between event outcome and the decision process. Outcomes cannot
always be used as a reliable means to quantify a reasonable decision (Orasanu & Martin,
1998). The perceptual cycle model (Neisser, 1976) is based upon the idea of a reciprocal
and cyclical relationship between the operator and the environment (Plant & Stanton,
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2013). Neisser presented the view that human thought is closely connected with a
person’s interaction in the world, both informing the other (Neisser, 1976).
World knowledge (schemata) leads to the anticipation of certain types of
information or clues. Accurate cue perception is critical to decision making. In most
operational environments, there are multiple cues available; however, when pilots
become startled, there is a tendency to reduce the number of cues that are sampled
(Wickens & Flach, 1998). Selective cue sampling can lead to a cycle of confusion that
further complicates the situation (Hilscher, Breiter, & Kochan, 2012). Schemata can be
conceptualized as having mental ‘slots’ that are used to structure the information linked
to them. Schemata represent linked neurons and memories of abstract concepts. They
are generally formed from specific instances and allow abstract knowledge to be
derived at the time of retrieval by sampling from domain-specific instances (Plant &
Stanton, 2013). Schemata are internal knowledge structures that are based on similar
experiences that capture the common features of this experience (Lieberman, 2012).
The use of schemata in decision-making is advantageous; they act as natural standard
operating procedures (SOPs) to direct decision makers to make appropriate responses
to environmental stimuli based on previously successful experiences (Plant & Stanton,
2013).
According to the perceptual cycle model (PCM), when an environmental
experience is encountered, relevant experiences (schemata) are retrieved to help
develop an appropriate response (Plant & Stanton, 2013). This leads to seeking out
certain types of additional information in as a way of interpreting that information using
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a form of bottom-up processing. The environmental experience can result in the
modification and updating of cognitive schemata and thus, in turn, influence further
interaction with the environment (Plant & Stanton, 2013).
Smith and Hancock (1995) have argued that the usefulness of the PCM
explanation lies in the interaction between operator and environment, rather than
considering the two separately. Decision issues arise when the selected schema (stored
and cataloged memories) is inappropriate for the current situation. In general, pilots
were found to utilize a number of different schemas in determining an initial response
to a situation. The use of schema aids perception and decision-making (Plant & Stanton,
2013). When the unusual happens, pilots tend to pay closer attention to information
related to specific cues relating to the unusual situation instead of seeking out
additional information to keep the “big-picture” in mind (Hilscher, Breiter, & Kochan,
2012). Alternative scenario interpretations are usually only considered when they are
consistent with preexisting expectations (Muthard & Wickens, 2002).
Morris and Leung (2006) found that mental workload was not significantly
increased, when task demand increased if pilots could revert to pre-existing schemata.
When inappropriate schemata are selected, incorrect actions and decisions can follow.
Over-reliance on pre-existing but inappropriate schemata have been shown to lead to
fixation on certain cues in relation to other cues (Stanton, et al., 2010; Plant & Stanton,
2013).
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Dual-Process Account of Decision Behavior
In unfamiliar situations, when proven rules are not available, behavior may
become goal-controlled using knowledge-based reasoning (Rasmussen, 1983). Coping
with complexity is largely due to the availability of a large repertoire of different mental
representations of the environment from which rules can be generated ad hoc
(Rasmussen, 1983). Purposeful behavior is based on a pilot’s perception of an event and
is experiential knowledge of similar situations.
Human behavior can be characterized by three levels of constraints or
performance levels. The levels make use of pattern matching and are defined as skillbased, rule-based and knowledge-based performance. Skill based behavior is
characterized by sensor-motor performance during activities following a state of
intention and generally take place without conscious thought. They are usually smooth,
automated and highly integrated (Rasmussen, 1983). This mode is mostly used for quick
and accurate movements. The body acts as a multivariable continuous control system
synchronizing movements with the behavior of the environment (Rasmussen, 1983).
When asked, pilots cannot generally describe their thought process involved in this type
of cognition. They refer to it as an automatic-like response. This type of cognition is
sought by training departments in response to time critical aircraft emergencies such as
an engine failure at rotation where a quick, automated, and precise response is needed.
At the rule based level, information is typically perceived as signs, which serve to
activate or modify predetermined actions or manipulations (Rasmussen, 1983). The
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boundary between skill based and rule based performance is not always distinct, and
depends on the level of training and attention of the individual (Rasmussen, 1983).
These signs are used to select or modify the rules controlling the sequencing of skilled
sub-routines, and cannot be used for functional reasoning to generate new rules.
During unfamiliar situations that have no known rules for control, performance
moves to the highest cognition level that is knowledge based (Rasmussen, 1983). In this
situation, the goal is formulated based on an analysis of the environment. This mode
can be characterized by evaluation of different solutions and can also include trial and
error. Figure 2 describes the various levels of how Rasmussen describes his behavior
model.

Figure 2. Behavior Model (Rasmussen, 1983)
Many decision-process models mark the first step of assessing the situation by
observing information and data scanning (Salmon, et al., 2008). The second part of the
process involves examining possible solutions depending on the interpretation of this
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assessment. Decision errors occur when there is a lack of consideration of important
data displays. The perceptual step builds the foundational level of Endsley’s concept of
situation awareness (Endsley, 2006).
Cognition and Emotion
Emotions are evolved situation responses that have multiple aspects. They
involve subjective feelings, cognition, information processing, expressive behavior,
motivation, and physiological responses (Diamond & Aspinwill, 2003). In fact, cognition
and emotion are intertwined constructs (Hilscher, Breiter, & Kochan, 2012). Cognitions
that pilots have stored in memory may not be sufficient for exceptional events (Hilscher,
Breiter, & Kochan, 2012). Insufficient cognitions changes pilot perception and as a
result, place more emphasis on how pilots perceive and interpret events based on their
motivational and behavioral significance (Compton, et al, 2003). Pressures such as
emotional pressures can alter rational reasoning by shifting decision-making criteria
from safety rules to subjective ones (Causse, Dehais, Peran, & Pastor, 2013). Emotion
and stress can bias decision-making and cognitive functioning particularly during
complex tasks that involve higher cognitive abilities (Causse, Dehais, Peran, & Pastor,
2013). Adding to this issue is an ingrained confidence on the aircraft’s reliability. This
sense of safety can leave pilots unprepared for sudden emergencies (Hilscher, Breiter, &
Kochan, 2012).
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Inflight Loss of Control
In terms of aircraft accidents, people often incorrectly associate takeoff and
landing phases to be the area where the highest risk occurs. In total numbers of
accidents and incidents, as defined by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),
takeoffs and landings are the largest accident category. However, according to Boeing
(2012), inflight loss of control is the single largest category of fatalities over the past ten
years accounting for 1413 fatalities from 18 accidents (Boeing, 2012). Inflight loss of
control accidents have more fatalities that both controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and
landing accidents. Many of these inflight loss of control accidents were the result of an
unusual event at the beginning of the accident sequence. Loss of control in flight can
develop rapidly and suddenly following inappropriate decisions by the flight crew.
Figure 11 below shows the various accident fatalities ranked by category with inflight
loss of control having the most.
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Figure 3. Causes of Accidents (Boeing, 2012)
The next sections of this literature review discusses two widely known airline
accidents in which inflight loss of control occurred following a startle event.
Aircraft Accident Colgan 3407
As referenced in the last paragraph, inflight loss of control represents a majority
of airline accident fatalities. Many of these incidents have been preceded by a startle
event. When airline crews are presented with a sudden onset of unusual circumstances,
they sometimes react contrary to what are generally accepted correct procedures
(NTSB, 2010).
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On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air Bombardier DHC-8-400 (Q400) operating as
Continental Connection 3407 crashed while on approach to the Buffalo International
Airport. All 45 passengers, 4 crew members, and 1 person on the ground perished as a
result of the crash. The aircraft impacted a residential area approximately five nautical
miles northeast of the airport while attempting an instrument approach. At the time of
the accident, night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time (NTSB,
2010).
The METAR for the airport indicated that the winds were from 240
degrees at 15knots gusting to 27knots. The visibility was 3 miles in light
snow and mist with a few clouds at 1,100 feet, broken clouds at 2,100
feet and overcast clouds at 2,700 feet. The temperature was -1 degree C
with a dew point also at -1. PIREPS both before and after the accident
reported light to moderate icing from 3,000 to 14,000 feet (NTSB, 2010).
The flight had departed Newark Liberty International Airport at 2118 EST (NTSB,
2010) for the 50-minute flight to Buffalo. The flight had been routine up until that time
with the exception of non-standard communication during sterile portions of the flight
(below 10,000 feet).
While preparing for the approach at 4000 feet, the first officer asked the captain
if the aircraft was accumulating ice to which he responded that there was ice on his side
of the windshield. The first officer then responded, “lots of ice” and the captain again
commented, “that’s the most I’ve seen – most ice I’ve seen on the leading edges in a
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long time” (NTSB, 2010). Air traffic control (ATC) continued to monitor the descent of
the airplane to 2300 feet (MSL) and at 2212 EST, the flight was cleared for the ILS to
runway 23. The crew had the autopilot engaged during this portion of the flight and the
airspeed was 180 knots. Approximately three miles from the outer marker, the captain
began to slow the airplane toward its final approach speed by reducing engine power
towards flight idle. At 2216:21 EST, the first officer lowered the landing gear and
selected flaps to 15 degrees as requested by the captain. The airspeed at this time was
145 knots and decreasing. At 2216:27 (six seconds later) the cockpit voice recorder
(CVR) recorded a sound similar to the stick shaker and the autopilot disconnect horn
that sounded until the end of the recording (NTSB, 2010). The flight data recorder (FDR)
that at the time recorded an airspeed of 131 knots. Within .5 seconds of the autopilot
disengaging, the FDR showed that the control column moved aft (commanding a pitch
up). The power levers were also advanced to about 75% torque (a measure of engine
power). The FDR also showed that while the power levers were being advanced the
airplane pitched up and rolled to the left approximately 45 degrees and then quickly
rolled to the right (NTSB, 2010). Concurrent with the roll, the stick pusher also activated
(it would activate two more times) attempting to push the nose of the aircraft down. At
2216:34 the first officer selected the flaps to zero (uncommented by the captain),
airspeed at that time was 100 knots (NTSB, 2010). FDR showed that the roll angle
reached 105 degrees right wing down before the airplane again began rolling left. The
airplane rolled approximately 35 degrees to the left and then began a rapid roll to the
right reaching 100 degrees right wing down. At 2216:50, the FDR indicated that the
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airplane had pitched 25 degrees nose down (NTSB, 2010). Impact with the ground was
at 2216:54. From the onset of the stick shaker where the airplane was still flyable to
impact with the ground was 26 seconds.

Figure 4. Flight 3407 – One Minute from Impact – Situation Normal (NTSB, 2010)

Figure 5. Flight 3407 – 30 Seconds from Impact – Stick Shaker Activation (NTSB, 2010)
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Figure 6. Flight 3407 -27 Seconds from Impact - Roll to the Left (NTSB, 2010)

Figure 7. Flight 3407 –21 Seconds from Impact - Roll to the Right (NTSB, 2010)
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Figure 8. Flight 3407 – 10 Seconds form Impact - Final Roll to the Right and Pitch Down
(NTSB, 2010)
The accident was investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB). An extensive review of both pilot’s qualifications was conducted by the Board.
The captain had experienced several unsuccessful events during his flying career
requiring additional training, however, other pilots who had flown with both the captain
and first officer described their performance as “good” (NTSB, 2010).
The NTSB in its findings stated one of the primary causes of the accident was the
captain’s incorrect actions in response to the stall warning during the approach (NTSB,
2010). It also stated that the icing on the airplane would have resulted in minimal
performance degradation (NTSB, 2010). When the stick shaker activated, the captain
responded by applying a 37-pound pull force to the control column, which resulted in a
nose up elevator deflection. The angle of attack (AOA) increased to 13 degrees with a
pitch of 18 degrees. As a result of the power settings and the captain’s actions, the
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airspeed dropped to 125 knots. After the first stick pusher activation, the captain again
applied a nose up force on the control column (NTSB, 2010). The captain applied two
additional pull forces of increasing magnitude in response to the two other stick pusher
activations. The NTSB characterized the captain’s actions as “abrupt and inappropriate”
(NTSB, 2010).
According to the NTSB, the captain’s performance suggest that he was startled
by the activation of the stick shaker and responded by making inappropriate control
inputs (NTSB, 2010). The NTSB further stated:
“The captain’s failure to make a standard callout or even a declarative
statement associated with a recovery attempt and his failure to silence
the autopilot disconnect horn (which continued for the remainder of the
fight and could have been silenced by pushing a button on the control
wheel) further suggest that he was not responding to the situation using
a well-learned habit pattern. The first officer was not providing guidance
consistent with an understanding of the situation (NTSB, 2010)”.
A scientist at the NASA-Ames Research for Aerospace Human Factors stated that
people under stress might not respond appropriately to events in their environment
(NTSB, 2010). The captain’s response to the stick shaker should not have required
cognitive effort to make the correct inputs or callouts (NTSB, 2010). In a possible
explanation to the captain’s response, the NTSB cited Colgan’s training on icing in which
a video on tail plane stalls was shown (NTSB, 2010). The recovery that the captain
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attempted was similar to that which should be taken during a tail plane stall, however,
the aircraft itself presented no evidence of such an event (NTSB, 2010). It is more
probable that in reaction to a startle event, the captain chose the incorrect cognitive
pathway for resolution and was never able to correctly diagnose the true issue with the
airplane.
Aircraft Accident Air France Flight 447
Air France flight 447 (AF447) also represents a case where startle of the crew
may have adversusly affected initial decision making resulting in a loss of the aircraft
(BAE, 2012). AF447 was a regularly scheduled flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris. AF447,
an A330, departed Rio on June 1st, 2009 carrying 216 passengers, three pilots, and nine
flight attendants. Routing of the flight was over the central Atlantic Ocean. The flight
proceeded normally for the first two hours and was flying level at 35,000 feet.
Approximately 2:10:05, the aircraft encountered freezing precipitation which
obstructed the pitot probes (BAE, 2012). The loss of the pitot probes affected the
autoflight system and the cockpit airspeed indications. The total time from onset of the
pitot issue to impacting the ocean was 4:23. When the autoflight system disconnected,
the pilot flying (PF) began applying a nose up command on the sidestick. The cockpit
speed indications dropped from 275 knots to 60 knots (typical of an icing event). At
2:10:16 the pilot not flying (PNF) stated “we’ve lost the speeds” then “alternate law
protections” (BAE, 2012). The PF made rapid and high amplitude roll control inputs
(from stop to stop). He also made an additional nose-up input that increased the
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airplane’s pitch attitude up to 11 degrees (BAE, 2012). The airplane was in a climb
through 37,700 feet at this point. At 2:10:36 the airspeed on the left side of the cockpit
became valid as the ice melted in the pitot probe. Airspeed at this point was 223 knots
which represented a loss of 50 knots. The PF reduced the pitch of the airplane
momentarily at 2:10:47 however, he then resumed a pitch-up beyond 10 degrees and
the airplane again began to climb. This pitch caused the airplanes stall-warning system
to trigger in a continuous manner (BAE, 2012).
The PF selected maximum thrust on the engines and made additional pitch up
inputs towards 13 degrees. Approximately 15 seconds later the right side airspeed
indicator became valid and recorded an airspeed of 185 knots (BAE, 2012). The PF
continued to command a pitch up and the airplane reached a maximum altitude of
38,800 feet and an angle of attack (AOA) of 16 degrees. At 2:11:42 the captain reentered the cockpit from a rest break. At that time all three airspeed indicators were
displaying valid airspeed data. Also around this time, the airplane was descending
through 35,000 feet with an AOA of 40 degrees, which resulted in a vertical speed of 10,000 feet per minute (fpm). The airplane was also experiencing roll oscillations
exceeding 40 degrees (BAE, 2012).
Due to the extremely low airspeed, the stall warning ceased. The PF
momentarily reduced the pitch of the airplane which again triggered the stall warning as
the plane gained a little speed. Unfortunately, the PF resumed the commanded pitch up
and the AOA approached 35 degrees. The last recorded data for the airplane was at
2:14:28. Data indicates a vertical speed of -10,912 fpm with an airspeed of 107 knots.
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Figure 9 is a graphical reproduction of the flight parameters from the flight data
recorder. The timeline for this diagram is the first 50 seconds of the event where the
aircraft goes from controlled flight to a descent rate of over 10,000 feet per minute.
The chart shows the aggressive handling by the first officer in both pitch and roll. It also
shows when the airspeed information became valid.
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Figure 9. Parameters from 2:10:50 to 2:11:46 (BAE, 2012)
Figure 10 shows that the airspeed indications were normal just prior to the
event. It also shows that the airspeed indications (for the first officer) may have not
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been reliable for a period of 40 seconds. It also shows that once the airspeed
indications were valid, a constant decrease in speed occurred until the end of the event.

Figure 10. Evolution of Airspeed and Pitot Icing (BAE, 2012)
Figure 11 summarizes the event from the onset of the frozen pitot tubes until
impact with the ocean. Large variations in pitch and angle of attack can be seen
throughout most of the event. The aircraft is completely stalled for the last minute of
the event, finally impacting the ocean is a nose high with almost no forward airspeed
and at a rate of descent of -15,000 feet per minute.
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Figure 11. AF447 FDR Data (MM43, 2011)
In its findings, the BAE studied 13 incidents related to icing and unreliable
airspeed. Air France had four such cases in their history with the A330 aircraft. The BAE
determined that in less than one minute after the autopilot disconnected, the airplane
exited its flight envelope following inappropriate pilot inputs (BAE, 2012). The airplane
went into a sustained stall as signaled by the stall warning system and strong airframe
buffet. Even though the stall warning sounded for 54 seconds, neither pilot made any
reference to the stall warning or the associated buffet. The crew never applied the stall
recovery maneuver. The incident startled the crew and they had difficulties handling
the airplane (BAE, 2012). The excessive pitch and vertical speed added to the erroneous
indication and emergency, caution, and monitoring (ECAM) messages, which added
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complexity in the diagnosis of the situation. The crew likely never understood that it
was a simple loss of airspeed data (BAE, 2012).
Conclusion
Although not intended to be all encompassing, this literature review seeks to
provide the reader a broad background on which to base this study. The review
discussed startle effect and the current understanding of its effect upon decision
making. Emergencies, where flight crews made the incorrect initial decision, become
progressively more difficult to successfully manage as pilots often selectively filter
information to confirm their initial decision. Decisions evolve from past experiences and
knowledge where bits of similar experiences are pasted together in the model
generation phase.
Decision-making is a complex process that researchers are only beginning to
understand. It is known that when pilots are startled by a sudden emergency that their
decision-making and subsequent performance can be adversusly affected. The startle
effect may lead to a breakdown in crew coordination and puts additional cognitive load
on the individual pilot. With over-reliance on automation, crews may not be well
equipped to handle a sudden inflight emergency that requires the use of hand flying
skills. The startle effect may, in some cases, result in incorrect model
generation/selection with incorrect decisions and/or actions being applied to an
emergency situation. Boeing (2012) suggests that inflight loss of control is the single
highest category for airline fatalities. Startle effect, cognitive overload, and crew
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breakdown can all be seen in both the Air France and Colgan accidents. In many cases,
simulator training in conjunction with deliberate practice has been demonstrated to
increase crew performance. Deliberate practice has been widely applied as an industry
solution to other inflight emergencies and applying it startle effect may be an effective
way to mitigate some of its inherent risks.
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CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This study was a mixed methodology study focusing on whether startle training
could help successfully mitigate the cognitive gap that exists during a startle event. The
first part of the study was a survey given to each of the participating pilots. The second
part of the study evaluated the crews as they flew one of the selected maneuver sets
and was quantitative in nature. The simulator part of the study was a quasiexperimental design with crews that did not receive startle training serving as the
control group. Each participating crew was evaluated either a low or high altitude
scenario depending on the day of the week. Randomly selected crews received training
on handling the aircraft during a startle event. The training consisted of both a briefing
and simulator practice. Practice in the simulator was equal for the crews in the trained
group lasting approximately one hour. The briefing consisted of personal instruction
using a power point presentation discussing the proper pitch, power, bank, and time
recognition (see Appendix B). The briefing ended with a mnemonic device that pilots
were expected to use and verbalize both in the practice events and the evaluation
event. Simulator practice consisted of a startle event not related to the evaluation
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profiles. It was intended to have equally trained and untrained crews to compare
performance between the groups.
The first test scenario was a low altitude and low fuel profile. The scenario
degrades with a system failure that causes a missed approach and a resequence for
landing. Time pressure, low fuel, and the unexpected missed approach combine to form
the startle event and event evaluation begins at the missed approach.
The crew flew a standard arrival procedure into Newark Liberty International
Airport (KEWR). The routing for the arrival had both lateral and vertical restrictions and
would be considered a routine procedure for approaching the airport. The specific
arrival chosen for this study was the DYLIN arrival (see Appendix D). The weather at
KEWR combined with traffic saturation has caused holding (at the METRO intersection).
This holding is unexpected by the crew resulting in somewhat of a low fuel situation that
adds an initial stress element to the scenario. The crew is cleared out of holding for the
instrument approach to runway 4R (see Appendix D) with approximately one hour of
fuel remaining. The exact amount of fuel depends on the aircraft in the scenario (See
Appendix D). The vectors and the initial part of the instrument approach to runway 4R
were normal. The weather was instrument flight rules (IFR) with a 500-foot overcast
ceiling and a visibility of one mile.
When the crew selected the landing gear down, around approximately 2000 feet
on the approach, one of the landing gear fails to extend. It was expected that the crew
will execute a missed approach at this point in order to try and rectify the landing gear
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issue. The landing gear malfunction is the startle event and time pressure due to low
fuel serve to add stress to the crew.
The second test scenario was a high altitude profile. The crew was briefed that
they are on a flight that terminates in KEWR, with routing via the DYLIN arrival. The
flight is at 35,000 feet (FL350), with a descent planned via the arrival. There have also
been reports of light icing descending into KEWR. Pilots are in instrument conditions
with light turbulence. The scenario involves loss of the aircraft's air data system, which
disables many of the auto-flight systems. With the air data loss, an engine fire warning
was introduced. The air data loss was the startle event and the engine fire warning
added a distractor and stress to the crew. Evaluation began at the loss of air data. The
air data loss renders the aircraft’s speed, altitude, and vertical trend unreliable with the
side effect of the autoflight system automatically disconnecting. The air data
interruption was of short duration and only a few seconds elapsed before instrument
indications return to normal. The autoflight disconnection forces the crew into a hand
flying situation and the engine fire warning serves as both a distraction and a startle
event.
Data collection consisted of crew performance as it relates to aircraft control for
each scenario. Each scenario is made up of five sub-tasks which were evaluated and
used to determine an overall score. The scoring methodology was taken directly from
participating airlines’ FAA approved advanced qualification program (AQP) evaluation
manual. Each pilot group was compared using a one-way ANOVA against the FAA
proficiency standard and then compared to the other group for significance. T-tests
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were performed on the different maneuver sets to determine if the proximity of the
maneuver affects the pilot's ability to successfully fly the aircraft. If the study
hypothesis is correct, the untrained crews should show a significant statistical difference
as compared to the standard pilot performance as defined by the FAA. In addition,
regression analysis was performed on various aspects of the collected data to gain an
insight as to where the variability lies.
Subjects
The population for this study were professional pilots of an FAR 121 commercial
air carrier. Furthermore, the study focused on pilots of scheduled passenger airlines.
Flight crews from the participating airline were asked during their recurrent training
cycle if they wished to participate in this study. They were selected based on their
willingness to volunteer for this study. Selection of crews generally occurred during
their final day of training when there was often extra simulator time available. If the
crew volunteered, they were requested to fill out a survey on their experience and
perceptions of their flying abilities, especially during unusual events. The crews were
informed that there was no personal data kept and no data linking an individual to their
performance.
Beta Testing
A small group test was completed on approximately 15 subjects. The nature of
the beta test was to determine an estimated effect size of the independent variable.
The effect size was used to complete a power analysis. In addition, the beta test group
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was used to establish the simulator parameters for items such as weight, fuel, and
induced problems. The beta test results are reported here and not in the findings
section as they are not considered part of the actual test data. IBM SPSS Statistics
(SPSS) was used to analyze the overall training effect and then for each scenario (low
and high). Tables of the initial results are listed below. Table 1 lists the basic
descriptives. A total of 15 crews participated in the beta test.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics Beta Group
Dependent Variable: Overall score collapsed across low and high altitude
Crew training
provided
Yes

No

Total

High or low
altitude scenario
High Altitude
Low Altitude
Total
High Altitude
Low Altitude
Total
High Altitude
Low Altitude
Total

Mean

Std. Deviation

4.0000
4.5000
4.2222
2.3333
2.6667
2.5000
3.3750
3.7143
3.5333

.00000
.57735
.44096
.57735
.57735
.54772
.91613
1.11270
.99043

N
5
4
9
3
3
6
8
7
15

The beta test found that the training effect was significant with p = .00 when the low
and high altitude groups (trained and untrained) where compared. The results are listed
in table 2.
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Table 2. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Beta Group
Dependent Variable: Overall score collapsed across low and high altitude
Source

Type III Sum

df

Mean

of Squares

F

Sig.

Square

Partial Eta

Noncent.

Observed

Squared

Parameter

Power

b

a

3

3.800

17.914 .000

.830

53.743

1.000

Intercept

163.209

1

163.209

769.414 .000

.986

769.414

1.000

Training

10.970

1

10.970

51.716 .000

.825

51.716

1.000

HighLow

.622

1

.622

2.932 .115

.210

2.932

.346

Training

.025

1

.025

.117 .738

.011

.117

.061

Error

2.333

11

.212

Total

201.000

15

13.733

14

Corrected

11.400

Model

HighLow

Corrected
Total

a. R Squared = .830 (Adjusted R Squared = .784)
b. Computed using alpha =.05

Table 3 below compares the trained and untrained groups for only the low altitude
scenario. The descriptive statics and ANOVA results are in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics Low Altitude Scenario Beta Group
Dependent Variable: Low Altitude Scenario
Crew training provided Mean
Yes
4.5000
No
2.6667
Total
3.7143
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Std. Deviation
.57735
.57735
1.11270

N
4
3
7

Table 4. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Low Altitude Scenario Low Altitude Beta
Group
Dependent Variable: Low Altitude Scenario
Source

Type III Sum

df

Mean

of Squares
Corrected

5.762

a

F

Sig.

Square

Partial Eta

Noncent.

Observed

Squared

Parameter

Power

1

5.762

17.286

.009

.776

17.286

.908

b

Model
Intercept

88.048

1

88.048

264.143

.000

.981

264.143

1.000

Training

5.762

1

5.762

17.286

.009

.776

17.286

.908

Error

1.667

5

.333

Total

104.000

7

7.429

6

Corrected
Total

a. R Squared = .776 (Adjusted R Squared = .731)
b. Computed using alpha =.05

The same comparison was done on the beta group for the high altitude scenario. The
results are listed in Tables 5 and 6. Like the low altitude beta group, the main effect of
training showed significance.
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics High Altitude - Beta Group
Dependent Variable: High Altitude Scenario
Crew training provided Mean
Yes
4.0000
No
2.3333
Total
3.3750

51

Std. Deviation
.00000
.57735
.91613

N
5
3
8

Table 6. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects High Altitude - Beta Group
Dependent Variable: High Altitude Scenario
Source

Type III Sum

df

Mean

of Squares
Corrected

5.208

a

F

Sig.

Square

Partial Eta

Noncent.

Observed

Squared

Parameter

Power

1

5.208

46.875

.000

.887

46.875

1.000

b

Model
Intercept

75.208

1

75.208

676.875

.000

.991

676.875

1.000

Training

5.208

1

5.208

46.875

.000

.887

46.875

1.000

Error

.667

6

.111

Total

97.000

8

5.875

7

Corrected
Total

a. R Squared = .887 (Adjusted R Squared = .868)
b. Computed using alpha =.05

Analysis suggest that between 73% and 86% of the variability can be accounted
for due to the training effect. G-Power was then used to calculate a Cohen’s D to
estimate the training effect size. The calculated effect size was .33 which reflects a
medium effect size. The given effect size was then used to estimate the number of
subjects needs to ensure an adequate sample size which with the calculated effect size
is between 17 and 60 crews.
Table 7. Cohen’s D Calculation Beta Group
Scenario
Low Altitude
High Altitude
Mean
3.167
3.375
Std. Deviation
0.916
1.112
Sample Size
7.0
8.0
Result
Cohen's d = (3.714 - 3.375) ⁄ 1.018725 = 0.332769.
Cohen's d = (M2 - M1) ⁄ SDpooled SDpooled = √((SD12 + SD22) ⁄ 2)
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Sample Groups
The plan was to evaluate 30 - 60 crews. This allowed for enough data to be
collected even if the effect size in the rating scale is small to medium
(Cohen’s d = .33 / r = .19). The number of pilots were chosen in order to gain a
statistically significant sample approximating the skill level of the general professional
pilot population. There were four main groups for comparison. The groups were
defined as follows:
1. Low Altitude – No Training (LANT)
2. Low Altitude – Training (LAT)
3. High Altitude – No Training (HANT)
4. High Altitude – Training (HAT)
Equipment
This study used professional airline pilots flying two different scenarios in an FAA
approved Level-D full flight simulator (FFS). Simulators that were utilized include A320,
B737, B757, B767, B777, B787, and B747. The scenarios were flown by a crew consisting
of a captain and first officer, similar to what would happen in actual line operations.
The training that some of the crews received was broad-based and not aircraft specific.
Data Collection Methods/Procedures
Data collection for this study focused on two parts: a survey and observed
simulator performance data. The survey consisted of approximately 10 multiple-choice
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questions that were evaluated using a Lickert scale. Questions focus on such items as
outside flying, previous military and/or aerobatic flying, and general hand flying
attitudes.
The simulator portion of the study involved flying maneuver profiles in an FAA
approved Level-D full flight simulator. The maneuver sets were evaluated by the
principle investigator. The investigator is a former instructor pilot on multiple transport
category jet aircraft with over 11 years of professional instructional experience. The
maneuver evaluation criteria were developed in accordance with airline training
procedures and protocols as set forth by the FAA. The specific evaluation criteria were
adopted from an FAR 121 passenger Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) program
(with permission), which was approved by the FAA. The criteria match closely with
evaluation standards set forth by the FAA in the Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) practical
test standards (PTS). The crews were evaluated on the success of the maneuver as
described in Tables 8-10.
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Table 8. High Altitude Analysis
Score

Criteria

5

Crew performance was excellent in both aircraft handling and problem diagnosis.
The crew had minimal altitude and heading changes, recognized the issue promptly
and applied the correct mitigation strategies.

4

Crew performance was good. Problem was correctly diagnosed with pitch and roll
not exceeding 5 deg/50 feet.

3

Crew performance was average. Some difficulty diagnosing the problem. Pitch and
roll not exceeding 10 deg/ 100 feet.

2

Crew performance was below average. Problems and/or confusion diagnosing the
problem or misdiagnosed of the problem. Major deviations in pitch and roll more
than 20 deg/200 feet.

1

Crew performance was unacceptable. The crew could not diagnose the problem
and misdiagnosed the problem. Excessive deviations and handling of the aircraft.

Table 9. Low Altitude Analysis
Score

Criteria

5

The crew remained well within standards and performance was exemplary. The
crew recognized the issue and handled promptly while recognizing the
deteriorating fuel state of the aircraft.

4

The situation was well handled with the safety of the flight not in jepordy. The
crew was aware of the time pressures and the fuel state and mitigated both.

3

The flight landed safely with no major deviations for SOPs with at least 30 minutes
of fuel.

2

Landed the aircraft in less than desirable conditions with regards to configuration,
fuel and time management.

1

The pilot committed major deviations from standards that were not promptly
corrected and/or were unsafe, or was unable to perform the maneuver/task
without assistance. The pilot crashed or lost control of the aircraft.
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Table 10. Evaluated Factors and Seat Positions

Factors

Seat Position

High Altitude

Low Altitude

Problem Diagnosis

Missed Approach

Pitch

Irregular Checklists

Roll

Time Management

Altitude Control

Fuel Management

Overall Control

Approach and Landing

Overall Score

Overall Score

Pilot Flying

Pilot Flying

Pilot Monitoring

Pilot Monitoring

Data Analysis and Statistical Modeling
Analysis was planned for within groups and between groups comparisons with
further analysis of significant factors. An additional analysis compared the training
groups and non-training groups versus the FAA standard. Overall factor and seat
position scores were also compared to the FAA standard, which for this study was a
grade of three as described above in the data collection section. The statistical
modeling program SPSS was primarily used to analyze the data. In addition, the survey
data was compared and analyzed to see if any significant correlations can be
determined. ANOVA, linear regression, and post-t- tests were the primary statistical
models used.
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Within Group Comparison
The first data set for analysis were the within group comparisons. Analysis was
conducted between Low Altitude Trained Group (LAT) and Low Altitude Non-Trained
Group (LANT) and the High Altitude Trained Group (HAT) and the High Altitude NonTrained Group (HANT). The first part of the analysis used the overall grade score (see
Appendix 1). Analysis looked for significant findings within each group using a one-way
ANOVA with the alpha level set at .05. Comparison between the overall grade and the
FAA standard grade (3) was also compared. A second round of analysis occurred for the
contributing factors of the overall grade. Linear regression was used to determine what
part of the variance each factor (if any) are significant. Again the alpha level was .05.
Finally, as part of the within groups comparison, the seat position (captain or first
officer) was tested for significance as a contributor to the overall grade using regression.
Between Group Comparison
The between-group comparison was similar to the within group comparison
using the same tests and tools. The between groups was between LAT and HAT
followed by LANT and HANT groups. The analysis sought to determine significant
findings of the final grade, using a one-way ANOVA with an alpha level of .05. As with
the within group comparison, linear regression was used to analyze both the
contributing factors and the seat position. Comparison to the FAA standard was
conducted in the between group comparison.
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Comparison versus a Known Standard
The final set of comparisons was conducted by collapsing across groups (trained
versus untrained, and then comparing against a known set standard. The set standard
was determined by the tolerances set forth by the FAA for an Airline Transport Pilot
(ATP) certificate. The data collection section above describes the grading standards as
set by the FAA and airline policies, which since they are approved are also part of the
FAA standard. Crews receiving, at least, an overall grade of (3) were considered to meet
the FAA standard. Any grade below (3) was considered below standard.
The training groups (LAT and HAT) and non-training groups (LANT and HANT)
were collapsed and then compared to the FAA standard using a one-way ANOVA with
an alpha level of .05. Comparison of the collapsed groups was also compared to the
survey responses using the Pearson Correlation test.
Protection of Human Subjects
The crews in this study were exposed to unusual but not extraordinary aircraft
failures in the simulator. These failures are regularly practiced during initial and
recurrent training. The crews are accustomed to having their performance evaluated.
There is also a minimal risk of performing in front of a colleague if the performance is
substandard even though the evaluation will be as a whole crew. This is mitigated by
not identifying a particular pilot with an individual performance. The volunteer subjects
were also encouraged not to evaluate each other’s capability based on this testing
scenario. Finally, crews will be requested to refrain from talking about the testing with
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other crews as to not compromise the test data. There will be no identifiable link
between the performance of the crew and any individual crew member (a condition set
by the participating airline in granting use of their simulators). Individual performance
will not be reported to any airline or entity outside the research project.
Since minimal risks will be involved in the study, the subjects will be informed
that the study will include various maneuvers that will be flown in the simulator and
that the crew's performance will be analyzed. There will be a check box on the survey
form indicating that the participants have volunteered for the study. The specific
language is as follows: “ By checking this box, I agree that I have volunteered for this
study and have felt no undue pressure from the airline, the University of North Dakota,
or the principle investigator to participate. I have also been informed that no data will
be kept linking any simulator performance to a specific pilot. Data collected is for this
research project only and will not be reported to any entity or airline. Final aggregate
results may be viewed in the published dissertation that will be available at the
University of North Dakota Chester Fritz Library. The researcher has informed me that I
will fly as part of a crew and may encounter some unusual situations in the simulator. I
also understand that I have the right to refuse participation or withdraw from the study
at any point without a change in relationship with my airline, the University of North
Dakota or the research team.” All participants acknowledged and signed the
participation consent form.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
This study consisted of two main parts, a survey and a flight evaluation. There
was data recorded in an FAA approved Level-D flight simulator, flown by pilots for a
major US based passenger airline. Volunteer crews were asked to fly one of two
different scenario profiles. Random crews received training that consisted of a briefing
and simulator practice. The training sought to mitigate the negative cognitive effects
following a startle event. The data mainly focuses on the effect the training had on the
trained pilot group. Analysis consisted of both within and between main groups with
regression analysis on the contributing factors that made up the maneuver set scores.
Crews were presented with either a low altitude and low fuel scenario or a high attitude
scenario with a loss of air data. The survey was conducted in order to gain a perspective
into how pilots at major airlines fly their aircraft, and how they perceive their own flying
skills.
Demographics
Forty crews who flew for a U.S. Global passenger airline participated in the
study. All of the subjects were active line pilots and volunteers. The pilots flew as a
crew consisting of a Captain and First Officer and had flown in their respective aircraft
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for at least one year. Crews were also divided by which profile they flew and whether
they received training and practice prior to flying the profile scenario. Each scenario
(low or high) was flown by 20 crews. In addition, crews were separated by what type of
aircraft that they flew. There were 21 wide-body aircraft crews (B747, B787, B777,
B767) and 19 narrow-body aircraft crews (B737, A320, B757).
Survey Responses
The survey was divided into two distinct parts: a pilot’s experience, and their
perception of their own skills. The pilot flying (PF) the scenario was asked to complete
the survey. The first survey question asked if the pilot flew outside of their current job
in another professional manner such as flight instructing. The results are displayed in
Table 11 and Figure 12
Table 11. Flying Outside of Professional Job
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Yes

6

15.0

15.0

15.0

No

34

85.0

85.0

100.0

Total

40

100.0

100.0
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Figure 12. Outside Flying
Survey responses indicated that only 15% of the pilots flew outside of the
current job. Outside flying generally consists of less sophisticated aircraft that require
more routine flying skill practice. Since only 15% indicated that they flew outside of
their airline job, the results were not considered significant.
The next survey question asked whether the pilot flew in the military. Of the
survey responses, 32.5% indicated that they have flown in the United States military.
The results are displayed in Table 12 and Figure 13
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Table 12. . Did You Fly in the Military?
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Yes

13

32.5

32.5

32.5

No

27

67.5

67.5

100.0

Total

40

100.0

100.0

Figure 13. Civilian versus Military Flying
Anecdotal personal interviews with military pilots suggested that those exposed
to military flying have a greater exposure to startle events and in some cases have
developed coping mechanisms.
The next survey question asked if the pilot had any type of formal aerobatic
training. This type of training may indicate better recognition of unusual attitudes and
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lead to a more effective response to an unusual event. The results are displayed in
Table 13 and Figure 14.
Table 13. Do You Have any Formal Aerobatic Training
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Yes

23

57.5

57.5

57.5

No

17

42.5

42.5

100.0

Total

40

100.0

100.0

More than 57% of the pilots indicated that they had received some type of formal
aerobatic training.

Figure 14. Aerobatic Training
The final survey question related to pilot experience, asked whether the pilots
had ever encountered an unusual event that they would describe as “startling”. This
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question was asked to gage how many pilots have experienced events (while flying) that
caught them by surprise. The results are displayed in Table 14 and Figure 15.
Table 14. Startle Events
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Yes

32

80.0

80.0

80.0

No

8

20.0

20.0

100.0

40

100.0

100.0

Total

A majority of the pilots (80%) indicated that they had been startled while flying, leading
to the conclusion that startle is somewhat common among professional fight crews.

Figure 15. Startling Events
The next section of the survey sought to gain a perspective on how pilots
generally flew the aircraft in normal line operations. This section of the survey asked
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the pilots to rate the questions based on a sliding scale of agreement (1-5) from
“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. The pilots were asked to select their agreement
with the survey questions. There was no option to select responses outside of the five
standard ones.
The first statement asked whether a pilot knows the proper pitch and power
settings for phases of flight such as cruise and approach. This is important because if
various flight instruments are lost, safe flight can be continued with just a pitch and
power setting. No pilots disagreed with this statement with 50% strongly agreeing that
they knew the correct pitch and power settings. The results are described in Table 15
and Figure 16.
Table 15. I Know the Proper Pitch and Power Settings
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly Agree 20

50.0

50.0

50.0

Somewhat
Agree

15

37.5

37.5

87.5

5

12.5

12.5

100.0

40

100.0

100.0

Neutral
Total
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Figure 16. Pitch and Power Settings
When combined with “somewhat agree”, positive responses provided by the
pilots recorded at 87% . None of the pilots indicated that they disagreed with the
statement. Responses indicate that a majority of pilots believe that they know the
correct pitch and power settings for the phase of flight.
The next survey question asked if the pilots often hand-flew the aircraft during
departure and approach below 10,000 feet. These phases of flight often contain the
most complex aircraft maneuvering. Changes in altitude, speed, and course are routine
in these phases. Departures involved changes in routing while climbing and configuring
the aircraft for high speed flight. Arrivals involve a similar sequence only in reversus
order. The results are displayed in Table 16 and Figure 17.
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Table 16. Hand Flying Below 10,000 Feet
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly Agree 27

67.5

67.5

67.5

Somewhat
Agree

9

22.5

22.5

90.0

Somewhat
Disagree

4

10.0

10.0

100.0

40

100.0

100.0

Total

Responses to this question were indicate that 67.5% strongly agreed with this
statement and 22.5% somewhat agreed. Only 10% of the pilots disagreed with the
statement. There was no neutral or strongly disagree statements. This indicates that
most pilots are hand flying the aircraft below 10,000 feet.

Figure 17. Hand Flying Below 10,000 Feet
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Mental rehearsal of different flight scenarios has been found to helpful in
shaping pilot responses to unusual situations. At the major airline studied for this
research, pilots are required to view and participate in organized “chair flying” during
the recurrent training cycle. The next survey question asked whether the pilots
extended this practice outside of their recurrent training cycle. The results are displayed
in Table 17 and Figure 18.
Table 17. Chair Fly Scenarios to Help Determine Courses of Action
Frequency
Valid

Strongly Agree

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

6

15.0

15.0

15.0

Somewhat
Agree

17

42.5

42.5

57.5

Neutral

11

27.5

27.5

85.0

Somewhat
Disagree

3

7.5

7.5

92.5

Strongly
Disagree

3

7.5

7.5

100.0

40

100.0

100.0

Total

The pilots indicated that they somewhat agreed to this statement 42% of the
time. The next largest group was neutral representing 27.5% of the responders.
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Figure 18. Chair Flying
The statement recorded responses in all categories. Responses indicated that a
57.5% of the pilots use this practice.
Being able to fly the airplane without advanced automation has been shown as a
key element in recovering from an unusual situation. When an aircraft is upset (outside
of the normal flight envelope), the automation will often disconnect (United Airlines,
2016). This survey question asked if the pilots were comfortable flying the aircraft
without the use of the flight director, autothrottles, and map mode. The results are
displayed in Table 18 and Figure 19.
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Table 18. Comfort Flying Raw Data
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly Agree 17

42.5

42.5

42.5

Somewhat
Agree

15

37.5

37.5

80.0

Neutral

3

7.5

7.5

87.5

Somewhat
Disagree

5

12.5

12.5

100.0

40

100.0

100.0

Total

There were no pilots who strongly disagreed with this statement. Pilots selecting
strongly agree and somewhat agree were 80% of the responses.

Figure 19. Raw Data Flying
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These responses indicate that most pilots feel that they are comfortable flying
the aircraft with raw data only.
Hand flying the airplane during the day in good weather is common, however
deliberate practice in conditions other than day visual flight rules (VFR) is important in
maintaining flying skills. The next survey questions asked pilots if they hand flew in
various conditions. The results are displayed in Table 19 and Figure 20.
Table 19. Often Practice Raw Data Skills
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly
Agree

22

55.0

55.0

55.0

Somewhat
Agree

10

25.0

25.0

80.0

Neutral

7

17.5

17.5

97.5

Somewhat
Disagree

1

2.5

2.5

100.0

40

100.0

100.0

Total

Of the pilots surveyed, 80% either strongly agreed or somewhat agreed with the
statement. A larger number of pilots indicated that they were neutral 17.5% with this
statement when compared to the other questions.
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Figure 20. Skills Practice
The responses indicate that most of the pilots practice hand flying under various
conditions.
The final question asked if the pilots used the autopilot for a majority of the
flight above 1000 feet. This question is in contrast to the 10,000-foot altitude hand
flying question and sought to determine what percentage of pilots predominately use
the autopilot for flight. The results are displayed in Table 20 and Figure 21.
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Table 20. Autopilot Usage Above 1000 Feet
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

1

2.5

2.5

2.5

Strongly
Agree

8

20.0

20.0

22.5

Somewhat
Agree

5

12.5

12.5

35.0

Neutral

2

5.0

5.0

40.0

Somewhat
Disagree

13

32.5

32.5

72.5

Strongly
Disagree

11

27.5

27.5

100.0

Total

40

100.0

100.0

This statement had the most varied responses with a slight majority (56%) of the
pilots either disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement. Pilots agreed with
the statement 32.5% of the time.
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Figure 21. Autopilot Usage

Flight Evaluation - Quantitative Analysis
A quantitative analysis was completed using SPSS on the high and low altitude
profiles and the sub-factors that comprised each profile. The profiles were analyzed
both individually and then collapsed together with the independent variable being
training as described in the Methods Section. Each of the three groups (high, low, and
combined) were analyzed using a one-way ANOVA. In addition to descriptive statistics,
regression analysis was conducted on the factors that made up each individual scenario
score. Finally, the combined group was compared to the FAA standards for Airline
Transport Pilot (ATP) certification. The results are discussed below.
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High Altitude
Crews flew the high altitude scenario 20 times. There were nine untrained crews
and 11 crews received the training as described in the Methods Section. SPSS was used
to model a one-way ANOVA testing for the effects of training (independent variable) on
the overall scenario event score. The descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 21.
Table 21. Descriptive Statistics High Altitude
High Altitude Scenario
N

Mean Std.
Deviation

Std.
Error

95% Confidence
Interval for Mean
Lower
Bound

Upper
Bound

Minimum

Maximum

No

9

2.666 .70711

.23570 2.1231

3.2102

2.00

4.00

Yes

11

3.727 .64667

.19498 3.2928

4.1617

2.00

4.00

Total

20

3.250 .85070

.19022 2.8519

3.6481

2.00

4.00

.67420

.15076 2.9333

3.5667

.53252 -3.5163

10.0163

Mod Fixed
-el

BetweenComponent
Variance

Effects
Random

.51653

Effects

The untrained crews had a mean score of 2.67 and a standard deviation of .70,
which is slightly below the standard for FAA certification (a score of 3), while the trained
crews had a mean score of 3.72 and a standard deviation of .65 which is above the FAA
standard. There were no crews that received a score of one (1) indicating loss of control
of the aircraft. There were also no scores of five (5) indicating a near perfectly flown
scenario set.
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A Levene’s test was conducted on the high altitude scenario. The test indicates
that there was no significant difference in the trained and untrained group variances.
The test results were F(1, 18) = .674, p = .422. See Appendix E for additional detailed
statistical test results.
A one-way ANOVA was conducted comparing the trained and untrained groups
(see Table 22). There was a significant effect of training on the high altitude scenario
score, F(1, 18) = 12.25, p = .003. The test confirms the research hypothesis that
targeted training can be successful in helping pilots maintain aircraft control during an
unusual and sudden startle event. In the case of the high altitude scenario, the null
hypothesis is rejected.
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Table 22. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects High Altitude
Dependent Variable: High Altitude Scenario
Type III
Sum of
Squares

Source

Corrected

5.568

df

Mean

F

Sig.

Square
a

Partial Eta

Noncent.

Observed

Squared

Parameter Powerb

1

5.568

12.250 .003 .405

12.250

.911

Model
Intercept

202.368

1

202.368

445.210 .000 .961

445.210

1.000

CrewTrng

5.568

1

5.568

12.250 .003 .405

12.250

.911

Error

8.182

18

.455

Total

225.000

20

13.750

19

Corrected
Total

a. R Squared = .405 (Adjusted R Squared = .372) b. Computed using alpha = .05

The effect size was calculated from the ANOVA results using the formula
R2=SSM/SST with the result being n = .64. This represents a large effect size R2 = h2
=5.568/13.750 Eta h= .64. The result indicates that the average person in the
experimental group would score higher than 73% of a control group that was initially
equivalent (Coe, R., 2002).
Regression High Altitude
Regression analysis was conducted on the factors that made up the overall
scenario event score. This was done to explore any significant factors leading to the
overall score and to pinpoint possible areas of future training. The factors are
summarized in the table below. Each factor was evaluated 20 times.
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Table 23. Descriptive Statistics Regression High Altitude
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

High Altitude Scenario

3.2500

.85070

20

Crew Training Received

.5500

.51042

20

Problem diagnosis

3.6000

1.14248

20

Pitch control

3.5000

1.10024

20

Roll control

3.8500

.81273

20

Altitude control

3.3500

.93330

20

The regression analysis was conducted in two blocks with block one being crew
training and block two consisting of the described factors in the previous table. The
ANOVA indicates that both models significantly improve the ability to predict the
outcome variable compared to not fitting the model. Model 1 had F(1, 18) = 12.25, p =
.003 and Model 2 had F(5, 14) = 10.02, p = .00. See Appendix E.
The regression coefficients were also analyzed to determine which factors (other
than crew training in model 1) showed significance. Significance was noted for the
factor of problem diagnosis p = .00. The other factors did not show significance (p >
.05). Collinearity analysis indicates that there are no examples of multicollinearity (VIF >
10). See Appendix E
Low Altitude Scenario
The low altitude, low fuel scenario was flown by 20 crews. There were 10
trained and 10 untrained crews as described in the methods section. SPSS was used to
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analyze the results using a one-way ANOVA. The mean score of the untrained crews
was 2.60 with a standard deviation of .70 and the trained crews was 3.70 with a
standard deviation of .82. As with the high altitude scenario, the untrained crews
performed below the ATP standards and the trained group performed above the
standard. There were no scores of one (1) which would indicate a loss of control or
crash of the aircraft. There were scores of five (5) indicating performance well above
the FAA certification standard. The descriptive statistics are summarized in the Table 24
below.
Table 24. Descriptives Low Altitude
Low Altitude Scenario
N

Mean Std.
Deviation

Std.
Error

95% Confidence
Interval for Mean
Lower
Bound

Minimum

Maximum

Upper
Bound

No

10

2.600 .69921

.22111 2.0998

3.1002

2.00

4.00

Yes

10

3.700 .82327

.26034 3.1111

4.2889

3.00

5.00

Total

20

3.150 .93330

.20869 2.7132

3.5868

2.00

5.00

.76376

.17078 2.7912

3.5088

.55000 -3.8384

10.1384

Mod Fixed
-el

BetweenComponent
Variance

Effects
Random

.54667

Effects

A Levene’s test was conducted on the low altitude scenario. The test indicates
that there was no significant difference in the trained and untrained group variances.
The test results were F(1, 18) = .450, p = ..511. See Appendix E.
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A one-way ANOVA was conducted on the low altitude scenario to test the main
effect of crew training. There was a significant effect of training on the low altitude
scenario score, F(1, 18) = 10.37, p = .005. The test confirms the research hypothesis that
targeted training be successful in helping pilots maintain aircraft control during an
unusual and sudden startle event. In the case of the low altitude scenario, the null
hypothesis is rejected. The ANOVA results are summarized in Table 25.
Table 25. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Low Altitude
Dependent Variable: Low Altitude Scenario
Source

Type III Sum df

Mean

of Squares

Square

F

Sig.

Partial Eta

Noncent.

Observed

Squared

Parameter

Power

b

a

1

6.050

10.371 .005 .366

10.371

.861

Intercept

198.450

1

198.450

340.200 .000 .950

340.200

1.000

CrewTrng

6.050

1

6.050

10.371 .005 .366

10.371

.861

Error

10.500

18

.583

Total

215.000

20

16.550

19

Corrected

6.050

Model

Corrected
Total

a. R Squared = .366 (Adjusted R Squared = .330)
b. Computed using alpha = .05

The effect size was calculated from the ANOVA results using the formula
R2=SSM/SST with the result being h = .60. This represents a large effect size R2 = h2
=6.05/16.55 Eta h= .60. The result indicates that the average person in the
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experimental group would, as in the high altitude scenario, score higher than 73% of a
control group that was initially equivalent (Coe, 2002).
Regression Low Altitude
Regression analysis was conducted on the factors that made up the overall
scenario event score, similar to the high altitude scenario. This was done to explore any
significant factors leading to the overall score and to pinpoint possible areas of future
training. The factors are summarized in the table below. Each factor was evaluated 20
times. See Table 26.
Table 26. Descriptive Statistics Low Altitude
Mean
Low Altitude Scenario

Std. Deviation

N

3.1500

.93330

20

.5000

.51299

20

Missed approach

2.8000

1.10501

20

Checklist procedures

3.1500

.98809

20

Time Management

3.1500

1.03999

20

Fuel Management

3.2500

.91047

20

Approach and landing

3.3000

.92338

20

Crew Training Received

The regression analysis was conducted in two blocks with block one being crew
training and block two consisting of the above described factors. The ANOVA indicates
that both models significantly improve the ability to predict the outcome variable
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compared to not fitting the model. Model 1 had F(1, 18) = 10.37, p = .005 and Model 2
had F(6, 13) = 28.13, p = .00. See Appendix E.
The regression coefficients were also analyzed to determine which factors (other
than crew training in Model 1) showed significance. Significance was noted for the
factor of missed approach p = .01 and time management p = .00. The other factors did
not show significance (p > .05). Collinearity analysis indicates that there are no
examples of multicollinearity (VIF > 10). See Appendix E.
Each predictor had variance loading onto a different dimension. This also
indicates no issues with multicollinearity.
Low and High Altitude Combined
The final set of analyses were conducted by collapsing the effect of crew training
across both the low altitude and high altitude scenarios. There was no regression on the
sub-factors of the combined scores due to the factors already being analyzed in the
individual scenarios. Analysis was also conducted on the effects of pilot flying (PF), pilot
monitoring (PM) and the type of aircraft involved (narrow body or wide body). Further
analysis was conducted to compare both the high altitude and low altitude scenario vs
the FAA standard for ATP certification for both the trained and untrained groups.
A total of 40 crews (80 individuals) volunteered for the study, of which 19 did not
receive startle training and 21 received startle training. The mean for the untrained
crews was 2.58 with a standard deviation of .6. The mean was 3.71 with a standard
deviation of .71 for the trained group. The determination of the scenario score was
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described in the Methods Section. Table 27 summarizes the group means and standard
deviation.
Table 27. Descriptive Statistics Combined
Dependent Variable: Low and High Altitude Combined
Crew Training Received

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

No

2.5789

.60698

19

Yes

3.7143

.71714

21

Total

3.1750

.87376

40

A further breakdown was analyzed to determine if there were significant
differences between the high and low scenarios when comparing trained and untrained
crews. The results are summarized in Table 28.
Table 28. High and Low Altitude Mean Comparison
Crew Training Received
No

Mean

2.6667

N

9.0

Std. Deviation
Yes

Mean
N
Std. Deviation

Total

High Altitude Scenario Low Altitude Scenario

Mean
N
Std. Deviation

.70711
3.7273
11.0
.64667
3.2500
20.0
.85070
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2.6000
10.0
.69921
3.7000
10.0
.82327
3.1500
20.0
.93330

A t-test was utilized to test for significance between the mean of the trained
crews for both the low and high altitude scenarios. The test did not show significance in
either case (p = .89 and .91) See Table 29.
Table 29. Means Comparison with Training
Test Value = 3.7/3.73

t

df

Sig. (2tailed)

Mean
Difference

95% Confidence Interval of
the Difference
Lower

Upper

High to
Low

.140 10

.892

.02727

-.4072

.4617

Low to
HIgh

-.115 9

.911

-.03000

-.6189

.5589

The untrained groups were also analyzed for significance between the low and
high altitude scenarios. The mean for the untrained also did not show any statistical
significance with p = .78 and .76. See Table 30.
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Table 30. Means Comparison No Training
Test Value = 2.60/2.67

High to
Low
Low to
High

t
df
.283 8

Sig. (2tailed)
.784

Mean
Difference
.06667

95% Confidence Interval of
the Difference
Lower
Upper
-.4769
.6102

-.317 9

.759

-.07000

-.5702

.4302

The results of the t-tests indicate that there was no significant difference
between the trained and untrained groups when the trained and untrained groups are
combined across scenario sets. The research question that sought to determine if the
proximity of the scenario had any effect on the outcome was answered. The data
indicates that the null hypothesis in this case is retained.
As with both the high and low altitude scenario, a Levene test for equal variances
was conducted. The test did not yield significant results F(1, 38) = .046, p = .83,
therefore the assumption is that the variances are equal across the groups. See
Appendix E.
The next step in the analysis was an ANOVA calculated using SPSS. The ANOVA
tested for crew training when collapsed across both high and low altitude scenarios.
The test revealed that the effect of crew training was significant F(1, 38) = 28.89, p = .00.
This means that the trained crews showed a statistically significant increase in
performance due to the effect of crew training. The results are summarized in Table 31.

86

Table 31. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Combined
Dependent Variable: Low and High Altitude Combined
Source

Corrected

Type III Sum df

Mean

of Squares

Square

12.858

a

F

Sig.

Partial Eta

Noncent.

Observed

Squared

Parameter

Power

b

1

12.858

28.881 .000 .432

28.881

.999

Model
Intercept

395.058

1

395.058

887.387 .000 .959

887.387

1.000

CrewTrng

12.858

1

12.858

28.881 .000 .432

28.881

.999

Error

16.917

38

Total

433.000

40

29.775

39

Corrected

.445

Total

a. R Squared = .432 (Adjusted R Squared = .417)
b. Computed using alpha =.05
The effect size was calculated from the ANOVA results using the formula
R2=SSM/SST with the result being h = .66. This represents a large effect size R2 = h2
=12.86/29.78 Eta h= .66. The combined effect size was larger than both the high and
low altitude scenario effect sizes. The result indicates that the average person in the
experimental group would score higher than 73% of the control group that was initially
equivalent (Coe, 2002).
The next test measured for significant differences in the pilot flying, pilot
monitoring (Captain or First Officer), and the type of aircraft. ANOVA testing for
differences between PF, PM and NB/WB yielded no significant results. The results are
summarized in Table 32.
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Table 32. ANOVA Other Factors
Sum of Squares
Low and High
Altitude
Combined

Mean Square

Between
Groups

12.858

1

12.858

Within Groups

16.917

38

.445

Total

29.775

39

.226

1

.226

9.774

38

.257

10.000

39

1.684

1

1.684

Within Groups

25.158

36

.699

Total

26.842

37

.095

1

.095

Within Groups

9.880

38

.260

Total

9.975

39

Captain or First Between
Officer
Groups
Within Groups
Total
Pilot
Monitoring

df

Between
Groups

Narrow or Wide Between
body acft
Groups

F

Sig.
28.881

.000

.877

.355

2.410

.129

.367

.548

The ANOVA indicated that were no differences in scenario scores with either the
Captain or First Officer flying F(1, 38) = .88, p=.36. It also indicated that there was no
significance to which crew member was the pilot monitoring F(1, 36) = 2.4, p = .129.
Finally, the test indicated no significance between aircraft type F(1, 38) = .37 p = .55.
This test answered the research question seeking to explore if significant differences
could be determined within these categories. In the above cases, the hypothesis of
significant differences is rejected and the null hypothesis is retained.
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Performance versus FAA Standard
The next segment of the analysis was conducted using a series of t-tests to
explore differences of crew performance from the FAA standard for ATP certification.
The crews for this study had just completed their recurrent training cycle where they
were certified to FAA standards.
The first t-test explored the FAA standard of three (3) to the overall mean (high
and low altitude scenario) of the untrained crews. The results are summarized in Table
33.
Table 33. T-test Training versus FAA Standard
Test Value = 3
t
df
Sig. (2-tailed) Mean
Difference
No Crew
Training

-3.024

18

.007

-.42105

95% Confidence Interval of
the Difference
Lower
Upper
-.7136
-.1285

Crew
Training

4.564

20

.000

.71429

.3878

1.0407

The t-test revealed, that in the case of no crew training, that performance was
significantly below the FAA certification standards. The mean score difference was -.42
that resulted in a significance of p = .01. This indicates that crew performance during a
startle event is significantly different from the FAA standard. In the case of crew
training, the results were also significant but in a positive direction resulting in a mean
score difference of .71 with a p = .000.
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Survey and Performance Correlations
The final set of analysis was conducted to determine if survey responses
correlated with crew performance. Analysis was conducted separately for both the
trained and untrained crews. The first set of tests for the untrained crews used a
Pearson’s correlation to highlight significant result. The results are summarized in
Appendix E.
There were no significant survey responses that correlated with the performance
of the untrained crews. There were, however, significant correlations between two of
the survey statements. The statements “I often hand-fly below 10,000 feet” and “I
often practice my raw data skills” was significant with p = .02. The statement “I am
comfortable flying with raw data” and “I often practice my raw data skills”’ also showed
a significant correlation with p = .03. These questions should be correlated because one
question generally produces the other.
Significant correlations were also explored for the group that received crew
training. The results were identical to the untrained group with the same two
statements showing significant correlations p = .00 and p = .01. The results are also
summarized in Appendix E.
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Results Summary
The data was collected and analyzed in two distinct parts: the pilot survey, and
the crews flying a scenario in the simulator. The survey was designed to gain the pilot’s
perspective on their experiences and attitudes towards flying. The profile scenarios that
were flown in the simulator sought to produce a startle event for the crews and then
record their performance.
The survey data indicated that over 80% of the pilots reported that they had
incurred an event while flying that surprised them. In addition, a good mix of both
civilian (67%) and military (33%) pilots participated in the study. The survey questions
were not correlated with crew performance in either the low altitude or high altitude
scenario and thus were not a predictor of crew performance.
The event scenarios were all flown in an FAA certified Level-D full flight simulator
(FFS), with accurate visual and vestibular sensory input. In both scenario types, the
crews that received training that consisted of a briefing and simulator practice showed a
significant improvement in performance than the crews that did not receive training.
This confirmed the hypothesis that targeted training on mitigation of startle effect could
increase crew performance. Regression analysis was also conducted on the factors that
made up each crew performance. The analysis suggests that problem recognition in the
high altitude scenario and the missed approach in the low altitude scenario were
significant predictors of performance on the overall profile.
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Crew performance, collapsed across both scenarios, was also measured against
the FAA standards for ATP certification. When crews received training, the data showed
a significant improvement in performance vs the FAA standard. Data also indicated that
untrained crews performed significantly worse than the FAA standard when presented
with a startle event. This result was unexpected. There were no significant results
when examining the pilot flying, pilot monitoring, or aircraft type as it related to crew
performance, rejecting the hypothesis that these factors would be significant. There
were also no significant results between the low altitude and high altitude scenarios
when looking at both trained and untrained crews. The null hypothesis was retained for
this research question related to event proximity (low or high altitude).
Finally, the survey responses were correlated with crew performance. There
were no significant correlations between performance and survey responses. There
were, however, two significant correlations that were solely related to the survey
questions.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Introduction
Startle effect has been well documented for the past 50 years. Vlasak (1969)
found significant impairment in cognitive function for the first 15 seconds following a
startle event. Other studies have shown similar results. Unfortunately, it is often during
this period that critical aircraft handling decisions must be made. According to Boeing
(2012), inflight loss of control is the leading cause of airline fatalities. Recent accidents
such as Air Asia and FlyDubai indicate the inflight loss of control continues to be a
significant safety issue for airlines. This study sought to determine if targeted training
could improve simulator performance of crews during a startle event. Volunteer airline
pilots flew two different startle scenarios in a full flight simulator. The scenarios were
designed to be similar to events that have caused major airline accidents. The volunteer
groups were divided into low altitude scenario groups and high altitude scenario groups.
The groups were further divided into trained and untrained groups. Data analysis was
conducted on the main effect of training within and between each volunteer group.
Additional analysis was also conducted on the sub-factors that made up each scenario
such as pilot flying, aircraft type, and maneuver sub-parts.
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Findings
The data showed that targeted startle training could improve crew performance
while flying startle scenarios in the simulator. Significance was found for the trained
crews in both the low and high altitude scenarios when compared to the untrained
crews. The effect of the training was shown to be high, predicting that trained crews
would perform 73% better than untrained crews (Coe, 2002). Trained crews also
showed a significant increase in performance when compared to the FAA standards for
ATP certification. The results answered the research question asking whether targeted
training could increase crew performance during a startle event in the simulator.
In the high altitude scenario, crews were exposed to failures similar to what
occurred in the Air France 447 accident as described in the literature review (BAE,
2012). Crews that received training that consisted of a briefing and simulator practice,
on how to handle startle events. This group performed significantly better than the FAA
standard and significantly better than the crews that flew the same profile but did not
receive training.
The low altitude scenario was modeled after the Colgan accident in Buffalo, NY,
and presented the crews with a low altitude startle event that, in most cases, pushed
the crews into a missed approach in a low fuel situation. The results were similar to
those of the high altitude profile in that trained crews performed significantly better
than the untrained crews.
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Unexpected results were found in the crews that did not receive the startle
training when compared to the FAA standard. The data analysis showed that the crews
performed statistically significantly below the level for ATP certification for at least a
portion of the time during the maneuver profile. It should be noted that there were no
crews who lost control of the aircraft during the profile and that all crews eventually had
a successful outcome. This data explored the initial reaction of the crews since this is
the critical decision making time frame. The crews for this study had just completed
their annual recurrent training cycle for their respective aircraft under what is known as
the advanced qualification process (AQP). In an AQP, Training Program, when a crew (or
individual pilot) falls below the FAA standard they receive training and then are required
to perform the skill again. This concept is termed “train to proficiency.” Crews in this
research study were only presented the scenario one time. This “first look” only takes a
snapshot of a crews’ performance in time and indicates where training could be
effective. It is not meant to be extrapolated to overall crew competency
Each maneuver scenario was made up of several sub-factors or components that
comprised the overall score. These factors were analyzed to determine their
significance in making up the total score and to uncover possible dimensions where
training should be targeted. The results for the high altitude scenario indicated that the
most significant factor in determining scenario success was “problem identification”.
This was consistent with previous research findings which showed that when crews
make an initial wrong decision, the in-flight issue tends to rapidly degrade. The low
altitude scenario was somewhat less clear in significant factors. Time management was
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a significant predictor of crew performance. The missed approach was also a significant
predictor which was unexpected. If crews performed the missed approach sucessfully,
the rest of the scenario generally was graded better than if the missed approach was
incorrectly flown. Minimum amount of fuel (45 minutes) at start of the missed
approach likely influenced this result.
The research also sought to determine if the pilot flying (Captain or First Officer)
resulted in significant differences in maneuver performance. The study’s data
demonstrated that crew performance was not affected by which pilot was flying. The
study looked at this dimension since in a majority of airline accidents/incidents, the
Captain is the pilot flying and it is the first flight of the trip pairing (United, 2016).
Simulator data also did not uncover any significance between the types of
aircraft in predicting the success of the scenario. Aircraft were grouped into narrow
body and wide body categories. Narrow body aircraft pilots have a greater frequency of
takeoffs and landings than those pilot who fly wide-body aircraft. This difference in
frequency may add to narrow body aircraft pilots flying proficiency and increase the
success of responding to a startle event. In addition, most wide-body aircraft rely
heavily on automation due to the long duration of their flights possible making a sudden
startle event more challenging. However, pilots who fly wide-body aircraft generally
have a more experienced background than pilots who fly narrow-body aircraft due to
the airlines’ seniority system. The research question on practice and experience sought
to determine if practice and/or experience could influence the overall maneuver score.
The research question relating to aircraft type did not show it affected the maneuver
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scenario in either a positive or negative way. There was no significant difference in
either pilot group.
The pilots in this research study were also requested to complete a survey that
asked questions about their background and flying preferences. The survey responses
were not linked to any crew member’s individual performance, but were analyzed in
aggregate with regard to simulator performance. The pilot flying the maneuver scenario
was the only crew member asked to complete the survey. This was done to keep the
survey responses equal to the number of crews observed (40) and to compare the
responses with the pilot who flew the simulator profile. The survey responses indicated
that the pilots generally hand flew the airplane below 10,000 feet and that they knew
the proper pitch and power for various phases of flight. Furthermore, a significant
portion of the pilots surveyed indicated that they had received formal aerobatic
training. The responses given do not necessarily correlate with simulator performance
when taken as a whole. If the trained crews were the only ones examined, then the
survey responses correlate with positive performance; however, when untrained crews
were added, pilots tended to overestimate their flying performance.
Significance
The data recorded for this study showed that targeted training can help pilots
bridge the cognitive gap when startled. Crews performed equally well in both the high
altitude and low altitude scenario, suggesting that the training had a broad array of
effectiveness. Both scenarios recorded a similar main effect: power of eta = .6
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suggested a medium to large effect size. The training offered consisted of a briefing to
explain the effects of being startled along with a short and simple procedure to help
mitigate the startle effect and regain (or keep) control of the aircraft. The study was not
designed to eliminate the startle response which would be very difficult to accomplish,
but sought to help crews manage the period of cognitive impairment. In summarizing
the training, the motto “live for the next 60 seconds” was often used. This is the time in
which the most cognitive impairment occurs. Unfortunately, crews often have to make
critical decisions in this time to keep control of the aircraft. The data indicated that
trained crews were more successful in managing the aircraft following a startle event
than those crews that did not receive training. Crews that received training flew
significantly better than the FAA standards for ATP certification, indicating a positive
shift in event handling even versus a standard crew.
The training suggested in this study has implications for the airline industry as a
whole. As previously stated, crews that were not trained showed a statistically
significant degradation below FAA ATP standards. Following the startle event, the
untrained crews lapsed out of ATP standards as described in the Methods Section of this
study. All of the crews were eventually able to successfully recover from the simulated
situation, however it is the decision making at the onset which can prove critical to
event outcome. During the study there were no crews put the aircraft into an undesired
aircraft state (UAS). This suggests that current airline training may be improved by
incorporating startle training. Several published papers allude to this idea in that airline
training has become rote and routine; not challenging crews with new situations and
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scenarios that expand flying knowledge and experience (Casner, Geven, & Willliams,
2012). Most airlines have a standard training profile that is determined by the
regulatory requirements of the FAA. This training is generally the same from year to
year resulting in repetition and expected outcomes. Training outside of this set
standard is often referred to as “proficiency training” (United Airlines, 2016), and usually
exposes the crew only at predetermined cycles and has more to do with technical
failures and not cognitive loading.
The pilots, through their survey responses, indicated that they generally hand fly
the airplane below 10,000 feet. Hand flying below this altitude provides a boost to skill
maintenance due to the fact that changes in all phases of flight occur frequently.
Takeoffs, approaches, and landings all require changes to aircraft speed, configuration,
and navigation (lateral and vertical). These maneuvers challenge piloting skills and keep
them sharp (Gillen, 2014). Overall piloting skills may be a key element in aircraft
control. A pilot proficient in hand flying will require less cognitive resources (to fly the
airplane) and may be able to devote more cognitive processes to problem detection.
Pilots in the United States generally hand fly the aircraft more than in other parts of the
world. In a paper presented at the Lufthansa Human Factors Conference (Gillen, 2014),
pilots employed by airlines from various global carriers were surveyed about their hand
flying practices. The results are summarized in Table 34.
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Table 34. Hand Flying Preferences
Company

Company Policy

Actual Practice

United States -

Company policy states that

A majority of pilots hand fly the

Global

the automation level is at

aircraft extensively below

the discretion of the

10,000 feet.

Description

Captain.
Major European
Middle East

Hand flying is encouraged to

Most pilots report hand flying

maintain proficiency

below 10,000 feet.

Company policy prohibits

Pilots report that they generally

hand flying above 10,000

engage the autopilot at 1,000

feet.

feet on departure and disengage
on approach once the aircraft is
fully configured for landing.

Asia

Company policy encourages

Company regularly uses FOQA

hand flying to increase pilot

data in disciplinary cases against

proficiency

pilots. As a result pilots rarely
hand fly the aircraft.

Southeast Asia

Company policy states that

Manual flying varied widely

automation is at the

depending on the flight crews.

discretion of the Captain

Lack of flying skills become more apparent when system failures cause pilots to
revert to manual flying skills to maneuver the aircraft. Simple failures can lead to a
cascade of errors and pilot confusion that in turn can lead to an undesired aircraft state
(Gillen, 2014). These system failures can also tax a pilot’s cognitive resources well
beyond their ability to cope with the situation (Gillen, 2014). Based on hand flying

100

preferences, the pilots in this study should be considered the most proficient and thus
the results should trend higher when compared to pilots who hand fly less.
Critical Evaluation
Studies involving airline crews in the United States are often difficult to
complete. Airlines and their respective pilot unions are reluctant to have a researcher
record live data on a crews’ performance. The only way to obtain permission for such a
study is to have the data de-identified so that no individual performance can be linked
back to a specific pilot or crew. As such, this research was only able to observe
volunteer crews one time to determine the effect of the training. Training results could
have been more conclusive if a revisit of the trained crews had taken place.
Unfortunately, this could not occur as it would make the individual pilots identified
which would violate the permission letter from the participating airline(s). Data
suggests that unused training skills will decrease in effectiveness over time and that
deliberate practice is required. It is the opinion of the researcher that if the training
presented in this study is not practiced, then the effectiveness (of the training) will most
likely decrease over time.
Any type of simulator training could be reasonably expected to an increase in the
crews’ overall scenario scores. Study subjects were asked to volunteer immediately
following their annual recurrent training cycle which included 8-12 hours of simulator
training/checking. All crews involved in the study received simulator training and
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practice immediately preceding participation in this study. As a result, scores may be
skewed higher than if crews flew the maneuvers without any previous practice.
Results in this study could possibly be biased in a positive direction due to the
voluntary nature of the participants. Generally, pilots who volunteer for these types of
studies are comfortable in their flying skills and interested in aviation safety. Pilots who
have difficulty in training generally would choose to not participate. Therefore, the
overall results might be skewed towards the higher end than the average airline pilot
population.
Implications
The startle effect is not a new concept and the effects of being startled are well
known. What is not well known is how to mitigate the startle effect in airline crews
where critical decision making must often take place concurrent with the time of
cognitive impairment following a startle event. Training and practice have been shown
to increase a pilot’s response to aircraft control during an event that catches a crew
unexpectedly. Targeted training should be procedural in nature and seek to become
skill base (best) or rule based behavior. This method requires a consistent and
systematic approach to dealing with unusual events.
To be effective, training that is described in this study should be implemented in
both initial and recurrent pilot training in addition to being reinforced in actual line
flying. This study has shown that significant positive effects of training can be realized in
as little time as 60 minutes.
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Follow on studies should look at the effectiveness of this type of training over
longer intervals. The training presented in this study was designed to be broad in nature
and cover various states of contingencies as it relates to a startle event. Such training is
intended to be applicable in a general way and is not intended to be aircraft or airline
specific. It is more of a philosophy in dealing with unusual events at the initial decision
making point to help bias a successful outcome. In the Air France and Colgan accidents,
that were described in the literature review, aircraft control was lost in the first 30
seconds following a startle event. Training should focus on this time period to be most
effective. Although sudden and unusual events cannot be prevented in aviation, a
pilot’s response to them (especially at the onset) can be positively influenced to aid in a
successful outcome. There is not a single solution in airline training to eliminate the risk
of a startle event, only mitigating factors, that when presented in multiple layers serve
to aid crews in successfully handling the event.
Recommendations
Startle training should be added to the training programs at airlines to make
crews aware of the effects on performance of being startled and mitigation strategies
that can help pilots successfully fly the aircraft immediately following a startle event.
Startle training, in order to be effective, has to be reinforced at specific training intervals
such as during each pilot’s initial and annual recurrent training cycle. Positive results
were shown in this study where training consisted of both classroom and simulator
practice lasting approximately one hour. Training should focus on what happens from a
cognitive standpoint and what steps pilots should take to stabilize the aircraft so that
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they can then determine the course of action to safely fly the aircraft. To be effective,
this training will have to be varied to prevent habituation.
Recommendations for Further Research
Research into startle training should continue. This research should attempt to
identify the best training interval for startle training to prevent degradation of startle
response skills. There may be a link between hand flying ability, and the general ability
to handle a startle response. In cases such as the Air France and Colgan accidents, the
pilots were faced with a sudden event that forced them into hand flying the aircraft.
Pilots who are competent in hand flying require less cognitive resources to do so, and
may be able to devote more resources to problem definition. This would be a good area
for future research as well. One further area for research may look at the link between
often practiced unusual situations in the simulator and their negative transfer to
unrelated events in the actual aircraft. During training, most of the maneuvers are
performed at low altitudes and require an immediate pitch up of the aircraft’s nose
(engine failures, windshear, and missed approaches are all examples). While these
responses are appropriate for low altitudes, the initial response to pitch the nose up
may not be appropriate at high altitudes such as seen in the Air France accident.
Conclusion
This study showed that targeted training can improve crew performance in the
simulator during a startle event. Given that skills learned in the simulator are generally
well transferred to actual operations, the study results should also be highly
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transferrable to the actual aircraft. Data shows that increased startle training could
significantly improve a pilot’s reaction to a startle event.
Startle events continue to be a major trigger resulting in aircraft inflight loss of
control. Although not every event will result in a loss of aircraft control, training can
help bridge the cognitive gap that exists during the initial seconds of a startle event.
Training such as what was presented in this study should be added to airline training
programs to aid crews towards a successful outcome of a startle event. A key element
in dealing with a startle event often involves manual manipulation of the aircraft
controls. Pilots who are proficient in hand flying will have an advantage in dealing with
a startle event. Training, practice, and hand flying each hold an important element in
successfully mitigating a startle event and preventing an inflight loss of control. Further
studies should seek to determine the optimum integration of these three elements. It
will take a partnership between the airlines, pilots, and the regulators to implement
startle training. Such training can be a key mitigation strategy in reducing the leading
cause or airline fatalities.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Definitions
AC: Advisory Circular
ACO: Aircraft Certification Office
AD: Airworthiness Directive
AEG: Aircraft Evaluation Group
ALPA: Airline Pilots Association
AQP: Advanced Qualification Program
ARAC: Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee
ASAP: Aviation Safety/Accident Prevention
ASRS: Aviation Safety Reporting System
ATA: Air Transport Association of America
ATC: Air Traffic Control
ATIS: Automatic Terminal Information Service
ATP: Airline Transport Pilot
ATS: Air Traffic Services
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BIS: Basic Instrument Skills: The ability to fly the aircraft solely by reference to the raw
data without the use of auto-throttles, flight director, or map mode.
CFIT: Controlled Flight into Terrain
CMO: Certificate Management Office
CRM: Crew Resource Management
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration
FAR: Federal Aviation Regulations
FCOM: Flight Crew Operating Manual
FCU: Flight Control Unit
FMS: Flight Management System
FOEB: Flight Operations Evaluation Board
FSB: Flight Standardization Board
FSDO: Flight Standards District Office
GPS: Global Positioning System
GPWS: Ground Proximity Warning System
HF: Human Factors
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization
IFR: Instrument Flight Rules
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IOE: Initial Operational Experience
ILS: Instrument Landing System
JAA: Joint Aviation Authorities
JAR: Joint Aviation Requirements
LNAV: Lateral Navigation
LOFT: Line Oriented Flight Training
LOS: Line Operational Simulations
Modern Aircraft/Glass Aircraft: Aircraft that have advanced automation to include: CAT
III capability, auto-throttles, flight director, FMC, and CRT displays instead of
actual instruments, the ability to LNAV and VNAV
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOTAM: Notice to Airmen
NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board
PDC: Pre-Departure Clearance
PF: Pilot Flying
PFD: Primary Flight Display
PM: Pilot Monitoring
PTS: Practical Test Standards Defined by the FAA Pilot Qualification.
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RNP: Required Navigation Performance
TCAS: Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
VNAV: Vertical Navigation
VOR: Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Radio Range
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Appendix B
Briefing Materials
The following are slides from a Power Point presentation. The crews that
received training were shown these slides as part of the classroom briefing.
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Appendix C
Grade Sheets and Survey
Note: The grade sheets and survey are presented as they were used by the
investigator during the data collection process. They have only been formatted to fit
within the page margins of this paper.
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Appendix D
Simulator Setup
This section describes the simulator setup for each type of simulator used in this
study. Each simulator was an FAA approved Level-D full flight simulator. The setup in
each simulator was different, and the selections required to achieve the failures were
also different. Crewmembers flew the simulator from their respective seat (Captain or
First Officer) and were briefed to treat the simulator as they would an actual flight.
Simulator

Low Altitude

High Altitude

Notes

A320

4500 – Fuel

35,000 – cruise

15 NM dogleg to
final

Fail all 2 air data
sources (Capt and
FO).

Aircraft goes to ALT
law in the high
altitude scenario

4300 – Fuel

35,000 – cruise

15 NM dogleg to
final

Fail 3 air data
sources (Capt, FO,
Stby)

19,000 Fuel

35,000 – cruise

15 NM dogleg to
final

Fail 2 air data
sources

6000 – Fuel

35,000 – cruise

15 NM dogleg to
final

Mach/AS unreliable

12000 – Fuel

35,000 – cruise

15 NM dogleg to
final

Mach/AS unreliable

B737

B747

B757

B777

Engine fire
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High Alt – use
lesson plan 14A

DYLIN Four Arrival KEWR (Jeppesen, 2016).
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ILS 4R at KEWR (Jeppesen, 2016)
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Appendix E
Additional Statistical Tests
Levene Test of Homogeneity of Variances High Altitude
High Altitude Scenario
Levene Statistic

df1

df2

Sig.

.674

1

18

.422

Regression ANOVA High Altitude Factors
Model
1

2

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Regression

5.568

1

5.568

Residual

8.182

18

.455

Total

13.750

19

Regression

10.748

5

2.150

3.002

14

.214

13.750

19

Residual
Total

F

Sig.

12.250

.003b

10.024

.000c

a. Dependent Variable: High Altitude Scenario
b. Predictors: (Constant), Crew Training Received
c. Predictors: (Constant), Crew Training Received, Problem diagnosis, Altitude control,
Roll control, Pitch control

123

124

2

1

Model

1.061

Crew

.205

.186

Roll control

Altitude

control

.009

Pitch control

diagnosis

Problem

Received
.440

.099

Crew

Training

.165

(Constant)

Received

Training

2.667

(Constant)

B

.230

.246

.304

.124

.356

.796

.303

.225

Std. Error

Unstandardized Coefficients

Regression Coefficients High Altitude.

.204

.196

.012

.591

.059

.636

Beta

Coefficients

Standardized

.810

.834

.031

3.561

.278

.207

3.500

11.866

t

.432

.418

.976

.003

.785

.839

.003

.000

Sig.

-.307

-.322

-.642

.175

-.665

-1.542

.424

2.195

Lower Bound

.680

.732

.660

.706

.862

1.871

1.697

3.139

Upper Bound

95.0% Confidence Interval for B

.679

.590

.759

.812

.636

.636

Zero-order

Correlations

.212

.218

.008

.689

.074

.636

Partial

.101

.104

.004

.445

.035

.636

Part

.245

.283

.101

.565

.342

1.000

Tolerance

4.083

3.531

9.883

1.769

2.926

1.000

VIF

Collinearity Statistics

125
.049
.029
.016
.004

3

4

5

6

35.529

18.762

14.012

10.693

4.290

1.000

2.596

1.000

Index

Condition

a. Dependent Variable: High Altitude Scenario

.304

2

5.598

.258

2

1

1.742

1

1

2

Eigenvalue

Model Dimension

Collinearity Diagnosticsa High Altitude

.56

.32

.08

.03

.01

.00

.87

.13

(Constant)

.01

.39

.19

.01

.40

.00

.87

.17

.00

.08

.74

.00

.00

diagnosis

Received
.13

Problem

Crew Training

Variance Proportions

.80

.16

.04

.00

.00

.00

Pitch control

.74

.18

.05

.04

.00

.00

Roll control

.55

.13

.32

.00

.00

.00

control

Altitude

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa Low Altitude
Dependent Variable: Low Altitude Scenario
F

df1

df2

Sig.

.450

1

18

.511

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal
across groups.
a. Design: Intercept + Crew Training

ANOVAa Low Altitude
Model
1

2

Sum of Squares df
Regression

Mean Square

F

Sig.

10.371

.005b

28.133

.000c

6.050

1

6.050

Residual

10.500

18

.583

Total

16.550

19

Regression

15.367

6

2.561

1.183

13

.091

16.550

19

Residual
Total

a. Dependent Variable: Low Altitude Scenario
b. Predictors: (Constant), Crew Training Received
c. Predictors: (Constant), Crew Training Received, Approach and landing, Time
Management, Checklist procedures, Fuel Management, Missed approach

126

127

2

1

Model

.449
.137
.427
-.109
.103

Checklist
procedures

Time Magmt

Fuel Mgmt

Approach
and landing

.084

Crew
Training
Received

Missed
approach

.088

1.100

Crew
Training
Received

(Constant)

2.600

(Constant)

.124

.167

.118

.115

.140

.194

.371

.342

.242

.101

-.106

.476

.145

.531

.046

.605

Beta

B

Std. Error

Standardized
Coefficients

Unstandardized Coefficients

Regression Coefficientsa Low Altitude

.827

-.652

3.610

1.186

3.201

.434

.238

3.220

10.765

t

.423

.526

.003

.257

.007

.672

.816

.005

.000

Sig.

-.165

-.469

.172

-.113

.146

-.335

-.714

.382

2.093

Lower Bound

.370

.252

.683

.386

.752

.504

.891

1.818

3.107

Upper Bound

95.0% Confidence Interval for B

.678

.759

.735

.773

.847

.605

.605

Zero-order

Correlations

.224

-.178

.708

.312

.664

.119

.605

Partial

.061

-.048

.268

.088

.237

.032

.605

Part

.366

.208

.316

.368

.200

.483

1.000

Tolerance

2.736

4.810

3.165

2.718

5.008

2.070

1.000

VIF

Collinearity Statistics
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6.441
.367
.084
.044
.040
.016
.008

2

3

4

5

6

7

.293

2

1

1.707

1

28.124

20.048

12.622

12.141

8.783

4.189

1.000

2.414

1.000

Index

a. Dependent Variable: Low Altitude Scenario

2

1

l

Mode Dimension Eigenvalue Condition

Collinearity Diagnosticsa Low Altitude

.38

.15

.35

.10

.01

.01

.00

.85

.15

.11

.08

.23

.02

.01

.55

.00

.85

.15

Received

Training

(Constant) Crew

Variance Proportions

.48

.31

.06

.03

.11

.00

.00

approach

Missed

.46

.00

.18

.36

.00

.00

.00

procedures

Checklist

Fuel

Approach

.58

.12

.10

.05

.14

.00

.00

.81

.10

.01

.07

.01

.00

.00

.04

.86

.03

.01

.06

.00

.00

Management Management and landing

Time

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa Combined
Dependent Variable: Low and High Altitude Combined
F

df1

df2

Sig.

.046

1

38

.831

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal
across groups.
a. Design: Intercept + Crew Training

129

130

N

Sig. (2-tailed)

Pearson
Correlation

.681

.742

.425

.128
18

Sig. (2-tailed)

N

.373

Pearson
Correlation

19

Sig. (2-tailed)

N

.194

Pearson
Correlation

19

Sig. (2-tailed)

N

.081

Pearson
Correlation

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Autopilot usage
above 1000 feet

Often practice
raw data skills

Comfort flying
raw rata

.428

18

1.000

.000

19

.929

.022

19

.309

.247

19

.712
19

.193

19

.566

.141

19

1

19

.228

.290

I know the proper
pitch and power
settings.

.091

19

Sig. (2-tailed)

N

.101

19

.228

.290

19

1

Pearson
Correlation

Chair fly
Pearson
scenarios to help Correlation
determine
Sig. (2-tailed)
courses of action
N

Hand flying
below 10,000
feet

N

I know the
Pearson
proper pitch and Correlation
power settings. Sig. (2-tailed)

No Crew
Training

Low and High
Altitude Combined

Survey Correlations No Training

.019

.534

.080

.411

.370

.218

.566

.141

.681

18

.343

-.237

19

19

19

19

1

19

19

.101

*

Hand flying below
10,000 feet

18

.321

.248

19

.359

.223

19

.373

.217

19

1

19

.370

.218

19

.428

.193

19

.712

.091

Chair fly scenarios
to help determine
courses of action

18

19

19

1

19

19

19

19

.543

.154

.030

.497

.373

.217

.080

.411

.309

.247

.742

.081

*

Comfort flying raw
rata

18

.261

.279

19

1

19

.030

.497

19

.359

.223

19

.019

.534

19

.929

.022

19

.425

.194

*

*

Often practice raw
data skills

18

1

18

.261

.279

18

.543

.154

18

.321

.248

18

.343

-.237

18

1.000

.000

18

.128

.373

Autopilot usage
above 1000 feet
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-.204
.375
21

Sig. (2-tailed)

N

21

Pearson
Correlation

.248

21

N

N

.739

Sig. (2-tailed)

Sig. (2-tailed)

-.077

Pearson
Correlation

.264

21

N

Pearson
Correlation

.177

Sig. (2-tailed)

21

N
-.306

.857

Sig. (2-tailed)

Pearson
Correlation

-.042

Pearson
Correlation

21

.470

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Autopilot usage
above 1000 feet

Often practice
raw data skills

Chair fly
scenarios to
help determine
courses of
action
Comfort flying
raw rata

Hand flying
below 10,000
feet

N

21

.629

-.112

21

.409

.190

21

.214

.283

21

.408

-.190

21

.053

.427

21

1

21

-.167

.470
21

-.167

N

1

I know the proper
pitch and power
settings.

Sig. (2-tailed)

Pearson
Correlation

I know the
Pearson
proper pitch and Correlation
power settings. Sig. (2-tailed)

Crew Training

Low and High
Altitude Combined

Survey Correlations with Training

21

.946

.016

21

.000

.694

21

.055

.424

21

.237

.270

21

1

21

.053

.427

21

.857

**

-.042

Hand flying below
10,000 feet

21

.656

.103

21

.691

.092

21

.713

-.085

21

1

21

.237

.270

21

.408

-.190

21

.177

-.306

Chair fly scenarios
to help determine
courses of action

21

.615

.117

21

.012

.537

21

1

21

.713

*

-.085

21

.055

.424

21

.214

.283

21

.739

-.077

Comfort flying raw
rata

21

.824

.052

21

1

21

.012

.537

21

.691

.092

21

.000

.694

21

.409

.190

21

.248

.264

*

**

Often practice raw
data skills

21

1

21

.824

.052

21

.615

.117

21

.656

.103

21

.946

.016

21

.629

-.112

21

.375

-.204

Autopilot usage
above 1000 feet
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